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SUMMARY
The goal of the first part of this thesis is to obtain a high-level theoretical un-
derstanding of how some alliances (for example, air cargo alliances) can be managed such
that their resources are used in an optimal manner. We propose a pricing mechanism to
manage the interactions of carriers, through the allocation of alliance resources and prof-
its, in a manner that encourages individual carriers to make decisions that are optimal for
the alliance as a whole. We assume that carriers act to optimize profit, and model this
profit-maximizing behavior using multi-commodity flow linear programs. These models are
incorporated into a mechanism that manages carrier interactions by setting resource prices
such that an appropriate allocation of both alliance resources and profits is attained. Be-
cause the behavioral models are used to determine the impact of resource prices on carrier
behavior, the allocations of resources and profits achieved by the mechanism are heavily
dependent on the underlying model employed. Thus it is important to consider the impact
of the model selected on the overall performance of the mechanism. After introducing two
distinct behavioral models, the performance of the mechanism using each model is analyzed
for its ability to ensure alliance optimal behavior is attained. We find that the behavioral
model selected can significantly impact the characteristics of allocations obtained using the
mechanism.
In the second part of the thesis, we seek to establish practical insights regarding how the
characteristics of potential partners impact the benefit that can be gained by collaborating
with these partners. Computational experiments are conducted to evaluate the impact of
network size, fleet capacity, demand distribution, and network compatibility on the benefit
associated with collaborating. A comprehensive study for simulated two and three-carrier
alliances establishes general insights regarding the compatibility of carriers with varying
network sizes and fleet capacities. The impact of increasing hub-to-hub connectivity between
partnering carriers is then investigated, followed by a study of the effect of market overlap on
x
alliance success. Finally, a real-world cargo alliance is analyzed, demonstrating the validity
of the observations obtained from studying the simulated alliances.
In the third and final part of this thesis, we develop new approaches for determining and
inducing fair profit allocations in alliances, providing alternatives to traditional approaches
which equate minimum acceptance requirements and satisfaction. The mechanism estab-
lished in the first part of the thesis is adapted to more precisely control the profit allocations
obtained, in particular so that an allocation as close to some predetermined “fair” allocation
is obtained. Several measures of fairness are proposed and implemented, and their perfor-
mance analyzed for each of the behavioral models discussed in the first part of the thesis.
The results lead to further practical insights regarding the compatibility of various types of




Consider a group of independent cargo carriers (for example, in the air cargo, sea cargo, or
trucking industries) who each wish to improve their own profitability. They may choose to
integrate some portion of their transportation networks in order to make better use of their
capacity by delivering more-valuable cargo loads. A group of carriers working together
in such a manner is referred to as an alliance. There are a variety of circumstances in
which the formation of an alliance among cargo carriers might be preferable to a merger
or acquisition; for example, carriers operating in different countries (or even in the same
country, depending on the industry) might face significant legal barriers to both merging
and acquisition. Second, carriers who operate under significantly different business models
might prefer autonomy to merging. Regardless of the motivation, it is reasonable to assume
that carriers considering forming an alliance are interested in designing that alliance to
function as well as possible, from the standpoint of both profitability and sustainability
over time. The challenge in achieving these goals lies in the tradeoff between decisions that
are good for the alliance versus decisions that are good for an individual carrier: decisions
that are good for the alliance are not always good for an individual carrier within the
alliance, and vice versa. In order for an alliance to operate in a manner that achieves
maximum profit, this discrepancy must be resolved.
To illustrate the questions that must be addressed when a potential alliance among cargo
carriers is considered, examine the simple case demonstrated in Figure 1. In this simplified
air cargo system, a time-expanded network with two cities and four time periods is depicted;
two flights operate between city 1 and city 2, both of which are operated by carrier A and
have one unit of capacity. There are four loads, each of unit size, that need to be accepted
or rejected for transport, and we assume that carriers individually make decisions to accept
or reject their associated loads. All loads originate in city 1 and are shown at their earliest
1
available departure time. The destination of every load is city 2. The carrier and revenue
associated with a load, as well as the delivery deadline for that load, are as shown in the
figure. Finally, the ground edges are fictitious edges that represent the ability of a load to
wait in a location over time.
Figure 1: Air Cargo Example with 3 Carriers and 4 Loads
Let us examine the case where each carrier operates independently. Carrier A owns the
capacity on the flights, and therefore can deliver both of his loads, for a total revenue of
$4. Carriers B and C have no capacity, and therefore must reject their loads and earn no
revenue. If carriers A and B choose to collaborate by sharing capacity, then two loads worth
a total of $8 can be accepted. Similarly, if carriers A and C collaborate, then two loads
worth a total of $5 can be accepted. If all three carriers collaborate, then the two highest
value loads can be accepted, for a total revenue of $9.
Throughout this thesis, we are assuming that earning the maximum amount of revenue
is the primary goal of the alliance. Clearly there is benefit to be gained by collaborating in
the above example; there is $5 in extra revenue that can only be captured by the alliance.
Yet, if carriers receive revenue only by delivering their loads, carrier A has no incentive to
participate in this collaboration because he can earn more revenue operating alone. One
possibility is to arrange for a payment as compensation for the loss of revenue carrier A
experiences by joining the collaboration. This could easily be accomplished if we assume
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a centralized decision-maker exists and can distribute payments. But given that a collab-
oration is composed of autonomous carriers who make independent operational decisions,
influencing the interaction among the carriers in reality is more challenging.
1.1 Contributions and Organization of Thesis
The goals of this thesis are threefold. First, we seek to obtain a high-level theoretical under-
standing of how an alliance can be managed such that its resources are used in an optimal
manner. Second, we seek to establish practical insights regarding how the characteristics
of potential partners, in particular network structure and demand distribution, impact the
benefit that can be gained by collaborating with these partners. Third, we seek to develop
new approaches for determining and inducing fair profit allocations in alliances, providing
alternatives to traditional approaches which equate minimum acceptance requirements and
satisfaction.
In the remainder of this chapter we introduce air cargo alliances as well as present an
overview of literature related to air cargo alliances. Chapter 2 addresses the first major
goal of the thesis: we propose a mechanism to manage the interactions of carriers, through
the allocation of alliance resources and profits, in a manner that encourages individual
carriers to make decisions that are optimal for the alliance as a whole. We assume that
carriers act to optimize profit, and model this profit-maximizing behavior using multi-
commodity flow linear programs. These models are incorporated into a mechanism that
manages carrier interactions by setting resource prices such that an appropriate allocation
of both alliance resources and profits is attained. Since the behavioral models are used to
determine the impact of resource prices on carrier behavior, the allocations of resources and
profits achieved by the mechanism are heavily dependent on the underlying model employed.
Thus it is important to consider the impact of the model selected on the overall performance
of the mechanism. After introducing two distinct behavioral models, the performance of the
mechanism using each model is analyzed for its ability to ensure alliance optimal behavior is
attained. A significant portion of the analysis is conducted using concepts from cooperative
game theory; a brief discussion of related game theory literature is included in the chapter.
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We find that the behavioral model selected can significantly impact the characteristics of
allocations obtained using the mechanism.
In pursuit of the second goal of the thesis, Chapter 3 contains results and analysis of
computational experiments conducted to evaluate the benefit to be gained by collaborating
for alliances comprised of various types of carriers. The chapter begins with a description
of how the alliances used in the experiments are generated, and results for two and three-
carrier alliances are then presented and analyzed. The chapter concludes with the analysis
of a real-world alliance, conducted by simulating an alliance based on the WOW cargo
alliance comprised of Lufthansa, SAS, Singapore Airlines, and Japan Airlines.
The experiments conducted in this chapter utilize the mechanism developed in Chapter
2. The results confirm that the mechanism performs as expected, but also demonstrate
that the mechanism may allocate alliance benefit among alliance members in an arbitrarily
disproportionate manner. Consequently, Chapter 4 focuses on adapting the mechanism to
more precisely control the profit allocations obtained. After discussing literature related
to fairness in allocation, several measures of fairness are proposed. The measures are then
implemented using the adapted allocation mechanism, and their performance analyzed for
each of the behavioral models discussed in Chapter 2. The results lead to further practical
insights regarding the compatibility of various types of carriers, as well as confirm the
importance of pursuing the notion of fairness in allocation. Conclusions are presented in
Chapter 5, as well as a description of some additional high level research questions and
more technical extensions that are motivated by this work.
1.2 Air Cargo Alliances
As is implied by the previous example, our motivating application is the air cargo industry.
Air cargo is assumed to be any freight, excluding mail and passenger baggage, transported
using aircraft. More specifically, we focus on combination carriers, which are those carriers
transporting cargo using passenger aircraft. As carriers take steps to improve the profitabil-
ity of their cargo business, they are increasingly considering collaborations for cargo that
are independent of those already established for the passenger industry. The first cargo
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alliance, SkyTeam Cargo, formed in 2000 and was comprised of the cargo components of
Aeromexico, Air France, Delta, and Korean Air [27]. These four airlines were already part
of the SkyTeam passenger alliance, but SkyTeam Cargo was formed as an independent
strategic cargo alliance. Similarly, the WOW Alliance formed in 2002 with the cargo busi-
nesses of Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, and Singapore Airlines. Again, these carriers
were already partners in the passenger industry, under the Star Alliance. However, a car-
rier outside the Star Alliance, Japan Airlines, was added later in 2002 [32]. Cargo alliances
among carriers that are not already partners in the passenger business are likely to become
more common, since carriers compatible for passenger alliances may not be compatible for
a cargo alliance. This is due to differences in flow patterns: passengers typically complete
a round trip, resulting in balanced flow, while cargo flow follows unbalanced trade patterns
[36].
We assume that service network design is determined according to other business con-
siderations (for example, in the airline industry, combination carriers set their schedules
and fleet assignments based on passenger demand); the alliance network is comprised of the
service networks operated by each participating member, or possibly some portion of each
member’s network. The key decisions for a cargo alliance therefore include, similar to the
passenger setting, how to share space and revenue among members. An additional consid-
eration in the cargo setting, however, is that of route selection. In contrast to passengers,
cargo is relatively insensitive to routing decisions; therefore the decision of how to route
cargo through the alliance network becomes a relevant factor in considering collaborations
among air cargo carriers. Determining the overall most profitable set of cargo to deliver,
and how this cargo should be routed through the combined network, requires a centralized
perspective. Full centralization is generally not an option, however, given the technical and
legal challenges associated with integrating the information systems of autonomous carriers.
Thus the maximum benefit will only be attained if the participating carriers can be encour-




This work unites concepts from optimization, cooperative game theory, and mechanism
design, all of which have substantial dedicated bodies of literature. Whereas cooperative
game theory studies properties of cost or benefit allocations among players, mechanism
design is focused on how to design a system such that a given allocation, typically one
that maximizes some system benefit, is achieved even when individual players are acting to
maximize their own gain. An introduction to the concepts of optimization and mechanism
design can be found in [7] and [18], respectively; cooperative game theory will be discussed
in Section 2.5.2. In this section we will focus on literature related to carrier collaboration.
There is very little available in the literature relating to air cargo alliances, most likely
since alliances among air cargo carriers are a very recent development. Most literature con-
cerning air cargo is related to dedicated cargo carriers, cargo operations, or the relationship
between the cargo and passenger industries. For example, the network design problem for
dedicated cargo carriers is addressed by [14] and [17], and short-term capacity planning is
studied in [10]. Analysis of airline alliances in the passenger industry is more prevalent,
but no existing literature uses a similar methodology or addresses the same questions as in
this work. [26] investigates the impact of international alliances on the passenger market
by comparing alliances comprised of airlines with complementary and parallel networks; it
is predicted that an alliance that joins complementary networks will be more profitable. In
response to a concern that alliances would lead to a situation where major carriers would
have a monopoly, [21] finds instead that alliances have merely allowed carriers to preserve,
not increase, their narrow profit margins through an increase in load factors and produc-
tivity. [13] in fact finds that consumers benefit from the formation of passenger alliances;
in the two domestic alliances that were studied fares decreased on the markets impacted by
the alliance, in part due to increased competition from rivals competing with the alliance.
[1] analyzes potential international alliances among carriers, applying non-cooperative game
theory to determine the profitability of an alliance under a given level of competition. The
primary issue addressed is the selection of international hubs to maximize the profit of
merging airlines.
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There is also limited research available on the impact that an alliance in one industry (air
cargo or passenger) can have on the other. [20] studied a passenger alliance between KLM
and Northwest and found that, ultimately, the effects on cargo service were positive. From
the other perspective, [35] investigates the effect of an air cargo alliance on the passenger
market, finding that cargo service integration can increase outputs in both the cargo and
passenger markets.
A widely studied topic in the passenger airline industry that is only recently being ap-
plied in the alliance setting is that of revenue management. Literature in this field seeks
to maximize revenue through management of seat capacity. [19] provides a review of rev-
enue management literature, but is focused primarily on revenue management implemented
by a single carrier. [8] describes the technical challenges associated with alliance revenue
management; in addition to addressing challenges, [30] discusses how coordination of seat
pricing and capacity planning are currently executed in the alliance setting. [33] provides
a more formal analysis of alliance revenue management mechanisms in which a free sale
scheme and three types of dynamic trading schemes are discussed. The mechanisms are
analyzed to determine their effect on the equilibrium behavior of alliance members and the
potential for the mechanism to maximize alliance revenue. Revenue management applied
to the air cargo industry is even more limited; differences between the cargo revenue man-
agement problem and the passenger yield management problem are discussed in [16], as are
complexities in developing additional models to facilitate cargo revenue management.
Outside the airline industry, carrier collaboration has also been studied in the ocean liner
shipping industry. [3] addresses issues related to the formation of alliances in the sea cargo
industry; in addition to the distribution of alliance revenue, design of the alliance network
is of critical importance. [28] demonstrates that alliances among sea cargo carriers lead to
increased service frequency and ship size, as well as increased similarity of service routes
among carriers. [29] provides a conceptual framework for the application of game theory
to alliances in the liner shipping industry. The ability to explain the instability of strategic
alliances using cooperative game theory is discussed, as well as the practical limitations of
applying game theory to the industry. For an overview of issues related to carrier alliances,
7




DESIGNING A MECHANISM TO MANAGE ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR
Even small introductory examples like that of Chapter 1 give rise to important challenges
that must be addressed when considering an alliance among carriers:
• How can resources be utilized such that the overall system profit is maximized?
• Given that this utilization will not necessarily be optimal for individual carriers in the
alliance, what incentives are necessary to encourage carriers to not only participate,
but make decisions that lead to system optimal performance?
• How can these incentives be distributed to the carriers, without relying on a centralized
decision-maker?
To address these challenges, we propose a mechanism that manages carrier interactions
by setting resource prices such that an appropriate allocation of both alliance resources and
profits is attained. These resource prices are henceforth referred to as capacity exchange
prices. We assume that carriers act to optimize profit, and model this profit-maximizing be-
havior using multi-commodity flow linear programs. These models are incorporated into a
mechanism that manages carrier interactions by setting resource prices such that an appro-
priate allocation of both alliance resources and profits is attained. Because the individual
carrier models are used to determine the impact of resource prices on carrier behavior, the
allocations of resources and profits achieved by the mechanism are heavily dependent on
the underlying model employed. Thus it is important to consider the impact of the model
selected on the overall performance of the mechanism. In this chapter we analyze the per-
formance of our proposed mechanism when two distinct models are employed, comparing
the mechanism output from a practical and theoretical standpoint. The models discussed
differ in how the actions of other carriers are acknowledged in the model for an individual
carrier within the alliance. Subsequently these models will be referred to as behavioral
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models, since they represent different ways to model the behavior, or interaction, of carriers
in the alliance.
After introducing a centralized model to determine the optimal solution from the cen-
tralized, or alliance, perspective, the framework for modeling the perspective of an indi-
vidual carrier within the alliance is discussed. Two behavioral models are introduced, and
a methodology for finding capacity exchange prices using these models is then described.
In the remainder of the chapter we analyze the effectiveness of each model with respect to
ensuring optimal alliance behavior. This analysis is conducted from three perspectives:
1. Centralized feasibility: does the model yield individual carrier solutions that remain
feasible when aggregated? Clearly an infeasible solution (for example, an aggregate
solution that utilizes more capacity on a leg than is available) is undesirable, as it
cannot be optimal for the alliance as a whole.
2. Cooperative game theory: does the model yield solutions that exhibit desirable game-
theoretic properties (i.e. being budget-balanced and stable)? Understanding the
potential for each model to yield such solutions is important because these properties
are desirable in an alliance setting.
3. Secondary markets: do the capacity exchange prices obtained using the model give
carriers incentive to buy capacity on a leg from a carrier who is not the operator of
that leg? Secondary markets lead to behavior that is detrimental to some members
of the alliance and, consequently, jeopardize alliance optimality.
The contributions of this chapter are both practical and theoretical. First, naturally, is
a demonstration that it is possible to develop a mechanism that can influence participating
carriers to behave in an alliance-optimal manner, and do so without relying on a central-
ized distributor for allocation of alliance revenue. Second, the majority of the chapter is
devoted to comparing the results obtained using two distinct models for the perspective of
an individual carrier within the alliance; that the solutions obtained under the two models
have different characteristics leads to an important insight: model selection can significantly
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impact alliance recommendations. Third, we prove that overestimating the amount of con-
trol wielded by individual carriers makes it more difficult to control the aggregate solution
obtained. A fourth contribution is the complete characterization of allocations obtained
under each model with respect to the core of the carrier alliance game, which is a valuable
application of the concepts of cooperative game theory. Finally, limitations of the notion
of the core are exploited in exploring the potential for resale of capacity in a secondary
market, and the negative impact this behavior has on the sustainability of the alliance.
2.1 Centralized Model
An important motivation for the formation of an alliance among carriers is the recognition
by those carriers that the alliance will yield benefit beyond what each carrier can accomplish
individually. Given that increasing the revenue earned by the alliance increases the benefit
that can be distributed among the participating members, it is reasonable to attempt to
determine the set of cargo loads to deliver, and the optimal routing of these loads, that
will maximize the alliance profit. This information is obtained by solving a network flow
problem from the centralized, or system, perspective; that is, the network and demand from
each participating carrier are integrated to create one large pseudo-carrier. The network of
a carrier is determined according to the amount of cargo capacity available on each flight
leg operated by that carrier; the demand associated with each carrier is presumed to be a
set of loads that the carrier must accept or reject for delivery. Note that a freight forwarder
can be incorporated into this modeling framework by introducing a carrier with a set of
associated loads, but no network capacity.
Because the focus of this work is on developing a methodology to manage the inter-
actions among carriers such that alliance-optimal behavior is achieved, several simplifying
assumptions are made to improve tractability. First, it is assumed that both cargo loads
and flight capacity have single dimension units and are deterministic. In reality, both cargo
and capacity are multi-dimensional, and the actual capacity available for cargo is dependent
on several factors including the weight of passengers, baggage, fuel, and mail shipments.
Furthermore, shipments may not be known or finalized until very close to departure time,
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therefore the deterministic demand is a fairly strong assumption. Second, it is assumed
that origins and destinations for loads correspond to airports, which implies that we are
not considering door-to-door pick-up and delivery services. This assumption is minor, and
implies that the responsibility of carriers is limited to transportation by air only. Third,
costs incurred by operating the network are ignored. While this assumption is reasonable
for combination carriers, as it is assumed that the flight schedule for an individual carrier
is motivated by the passenger industry and is therefore fixed, it would be strong in other
industries such as the ocean-liner shipping or trucking industries. Finally, load splitting is
permitted in order to obtain a standard multi-commodity flow linear program. This as-
sumption is reasonable if the standard unit of measure for a cargo load is small relative to
the capacity of a plane, both of which depend on the specific carrier(s) studied.
The length and units of the time horizon considered are intentionally not specified,
because these should be determined according to the needs and preferences of the alliance.
For example, in order to determine the long-term compatibility of a group of carriers or
other strategic decisions, it may be appropriate to consider a longer horizon with larger units
of time, as exact flight schedules and fleet assignments are only known for the immediate
future. On the other hand, a shorter time horizon with more exact flight information (and
hence shorter units of time) is required to effectively determine capacity exchange prices,
routing, and other operational decisions; these types of decisions should therefore be made
at appropriate intervals on a rolling time horizon. In practice, the frequency with which
capacity exchange prices are updated will depend on how robust the prices are with respect
to variability in demand; this topic is identified in Chapter 5 as a direction for future
research.
Let N denote the set of carriers, and Ei the set of legs operated by each carrier i ∈ N .
The set A contains all airports covered by the legs in E. Given a planning horizon of T
time periods, let V denote the set of nodes (a, t) for each a ∈ A and t = 1..T . Each leg
e ∈ E has capacity ke. Each carrier has a load set Li in which an individual load (o, d, i)
is characterized by an origin o and destination d. The size and per unit revenue of load
(o, d, i) is d(o,d,i) and r(o,d,i), respectively. The centralized goal is to find a flow of loads f
12


















(v,w) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V,∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (2)
∑
(o,d,i)∈L
f (o,d,i)e ≤ ke ∀e ∈ E (3)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (4)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0.
(1) reflects the centralized goal of maximizing the amount of revenue earned from deliv-
ering loads; the flow variable f (o,d,i)(d,o,i) represents flow on a fictitious edge from the destination
d to the origin o of load i, which is introduced to account for the amount of load (o, d, i)
that is delivered. (2) are flow balance constraints, enforcing that every unit accepted for
shipment must be appropriately routed through the network. (3) are capacity constraints
for each flight, while (4) ensure that the amount of a load delivered does not exceed its size.
Let f∗ be the optimal solution to C; from f∗ we obtain the optimal accept-reject decision
for each load, as well as the optimal routing for the set of accepted loads.
2.2 Capacity Exchange Prices and Resulting Allocations
In order for the alliance to realize its maximum profit, carriers must make their accept-reject
and routing decisions in accordance with f∗. We seek to provide a structure to encourage
the exchange of capacity among carriers, as carriers will clearly need incentive to allow their
capacity to be used by other carriers so that f∗ can be achieved. A natural way to provide
this incentive is by establishing a system in which carriers receive payments in exchange for
capacity used by other carriers. We refer to these payments as capacity exchange prices.
How to determine capacity exchange prices will be discussed later in this section.
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If ce is the capacity exchange price on leg e, the net profit from capacity exchanges for


















The term si is essentially a side payment provided to carrier i to compensate i for the value
of capacity being used by other carriers. If si is negative, then carrier i can be thought of
as a net consumer of capacity value.







The net profit xi earned by carrier i is given by xi = qi + si. We say that xi is carrier i’s
allocation.
2.3 Individual Carrier Behavioral Models
What should the value of the capacity exchange prices be in order to ensure that each
carrier’s allocation is such that the carrier will willingly participate in the alliance? Given
that a carrier chooses to participate in the alliance, how can he be encouraged to abide by
the centralized solution f∗?
In this section we discuss two distinct ways to model the perspective of an individual
carrier in an alliance. The goal in establishing these models is to understand how capacity
exchange prices impact the acceptance and routing decisions of an individual carrier. First,
however, we discuss a key component in developing alternative behavioral models.
2.3.1 Recognizing the Use of Capacity by Partner Carriers
A critical consideration in modeling the perspective of an individual carrier within an al-
liance is the fact that a carrier does not operate in isolation. Rather, a carrier must consider
the use of capacity by other carriers when making routing decisions. To demonstrate why a
model which ignores the use of capacity by other carriers is invalid, consider the following
example.
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Figure 2 illustrates the time-expanded network, with two capacitated edges (edges (1, 3)
and (2, 4)) that represent flights operated by carrier B. The capacity on each of these edges
is two. Edges (1, 2) and (3, 4) are ground edges, representing the ability of a load to wait
in a location over time, and therefore have unlimited capacity. The loads are described in
Table 1. For example, load (1, 4, A) represents a load associated with carrier A with ready
time and origin location corresponding to node 1, and delivery deadline and destination
corresponding to node 3. The revenue r(1,3,A) associated with this load is 1, and the size




Figure 2: Alliance Network for Example Ignoring Capacity Use by Partner Carriers
Table 1: Loads for Example Ignoring Capacity Use by Partner Carriers
Load Per-Unit Revenue (r(o,d,k)) Size (d(o,d,k))
(1, 4, A) 1 2
(1, 3, B) 1 1
(2, 4, B) 1 1





(4,2,B) = 1. The optimal routing is for load (1, 3, B) to travel on leg (1, 3), load (2, 4, B)
to travel on leg (2, 4), and for load (1, 4, A) to be split, with one unit travelling on leg (1, 3)
and one unit on (2, 4). A behavioral model for carrier A which ignores the use of capacity
by carrier B is as follows:
































(1,3) ≤ 2 (8)
f
(1,4,A)








e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
where c(1,3) and c(2,4) in (7) are the capacity exchange prices that carrier A must pay for
the use of capacity on legs (1, 3) and (2, 4), respectively. Notice that the only flow variables
in the above model pertain to the load associated with carrier A, and that the capacity
constraints (8) and (9) imply that carrier A has full use of the alliance capacity.




(4,1,A) = 2, and solution




(4,1,A) = 2. That is, in solution S1 both
units of load (1, 4, A) are travelling on leg (1, 3), while in solution S2 both units of the
load are travelling on leg (2, 4). If c(1,3) < c(2,4), then S1 is optimal for ModelA, while if
c(1,3) > c(2,4), then S2 is optimal for ModelA. If c(1,3) = c(2,4), then both S1 and S2 are
optimal for ModelA. The centralized optimal solution, in which load (1, 4, A) is delivered
using both leg (1, 3) and (2, 4), does not in fact correspond to a basic solution for ModelA,
and therefore cannot be obtained using a standard LP solver even when c(1,3) = c(2,4).
Given that the goal of establishing a behavioral model is to find a set of capacity exchange
prices that will encourage each carrier to behave in an alliance-optimal manner, ModelA is
clearly not sufficient: no matter how the exchange prices are set, carrier A will never choose
to route load (1, 4, A) in accordance with the centralized optimal solution.
Although it is clear in principal that capacity used by other carriers must be acknowl-
edged in the model for an individual carrier, it is not clear mathematically how this can
best be accomplished. In the remainder of this section we present two behavioral models,
each with a distinct method for incorporating the use of capacity other carriers. In the first
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model, the capacity utilized by other carriers is protected by introducing appropriate capac-
ity restrictions. In the second model, the use of capacity by other carriers is acknowledged
by including flow variables for loads associated with other carriers.
2.3.2 Limited Control Model
We have developed the Limited Control model to represent realistic restrictions on the
decisions available to an individual carrier participating in an alliance. In the model, the use
of capacity by other carriers is acknowledged by limiting carrier i’s use of capacity on each
flight. Pre-determining capacity allotments is a realistic approach given current industry
practice; a carrier typically dedicates space on each flight to specific partnering carriers
and freight forwarders. Intuitively, the capacity available on a flight can be partitioned
according to the centralized solution f∗; if carrier i uses kie units of capacity on leg e in f∗,
then the individual model for carrier i will restrict carrier i to at most kie units of capacity
on leg e. As is typically the case in reality, the operator of a leg has use of all capacity that
is not set aside for other carriers (or forwarders). More specifically, we use the following
rules to determine the amount of capacity allotted to each carrier (or forwarder):









e to each carrier i.
















• Ground edges are not subject to capacity allotments, as they are assumed to have
infinite capacity.
Given an allotment of capacity kie on every leg e ∈ E, the Limited Control model for


























(v,w) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V,∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (11)
∑
(o,d,i)∈Li
f (o,d,i)e ≤ kie ∀e ∈ E (12)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (13)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0. (14)
Like the Centralized model C, the Limited Control model is a multi-commodity flow
LP. The objective function value (10) is equal to the total revenue earned from delivered
loads minus the sum of capacity exchange prices paid. Note that this value is a lower bound
on xi, the actual profit allocated to carrier i, because it excludes exchange prices that will
be paid to carrier i.
2.3.3 Strict Control Model
The second model we discuss is based on a model utilized by [3] for one component of their
work in the liner shipping industry. In this alternative model, the flow variables for all
the loads in the system, including loads associated with other carriers, are included in the
model for carrier i. Thus the use of capacity by other carriers is acknowledged explicitly
through the flow variables of their associated loads. The Strict Control multi-commodity






























(v,w) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (16)
∑
(o,d,i)∈L
f (o,d,i)e ≤ ke ∀e ∈ E (17)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (18)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0. (19)
The second term of the objective function (15) reflects the capacity exchange prices received
by carrier i as other carriers use capacity operated by carrier i. Therefore when capacity
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exchange prices are high enough, carrier i is encouraged to leave capacity open for use
by other carriers. We refer to this model as the Strict Control model (Stricti) because
it implies mathematically that a single carrier has full control over the decisions of other
carriers.
2.4 Using Inverse Optimization to Find Capacity Exchange Prices
Given a model to represent the behavior of an individual within the alliance, we seek capacity
exchange prices ce such that the optimal solution to the individual model for carrier i will
correspond to the centralized optimal solution f∗. This can be accomplished using inverse
optimization. In traditional optimization, optimal values for variables are identified based
on a given set of model parameters, whereas in inverse optimization we seek a set of model
parameters that will make a particular feasible solution optimal [5]. Because a solution
f∗ must be optimal when it satisfies primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary
slackness conditions, the inverse problem for a carrier is a formulated using the dual of his
individual problem, making modifications to the constraints to ensure that a feasible dual
solution will satisfy complementary slackness conditions with f∗.
In this section we formulate the inverse optimal problem under each behavioral model,
and prove that the problem is feasible for any alliance. The section concludes with an
example demonstrating the methodology.
2.4.1 The Inverse Problem Under the Limited Control Model
As described previously, the inverse problem for carrier i under the Limited Control model











s.t. πi,(o,d,i)v − πi,(o,d,i)u + αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ Ei (20)
πi,(o,d,i)v − πi,(o,d,i)u + αi(u,v) ≥ −c(u,v) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) /∈ Ei (21)
πi,(o,d,i)o − πi,(o,d,i)d + βi,(o,d,i) ≥ r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (22)
πi,(o,d,i)v ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (23)
αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E
βi,(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (24)
where πi, αi, and βi are the dual variables associated with the flow balance constraints,
capacity constraints, and demand constraints, respectively, for carrier i. Constraints (20)-
(21) correspond to each flow variable f (o,d,i)(u,v) . When carrier i operates leg (u, v), he is not
required to pay to use capacity for transporting load (o, d, i) on (u, v), hence the right-hand
sides of (20) are 0. When carrier i does not operate leg (u, v), he must pay the capacity
exchange price c(u,v) for each unit of load (o, d, i) transported on (u, v), therefore the right-
hand sides of (21) are −c(u,v). (22) correspond to the variables f (o,d,i)(d,o,i) ; for each unit of load
(o, d, i) delivered, carrier i earns r(o,d,i) in revenue. For this reason, the right-hand sides of
(22) are r(o,d,i).
The inverse problem for carrier i based on the Limited Control model, InvLCi, is formed
by modifying the constraints of DLCi in order to ensure that complementary slackness
conditions will be satisfied for (πi, αi, βi) and f∗. For each variable that is positive in the
centralized optimal solution f∗, the corresponding dual constraint must hold with equality.
In addition, the following constraints are included in InvLCi:






βi,(o,d,i) = 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) < d(o,d,i) (26)
ce ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E. (27)
(25) invokes the complementary slackness condition for (12) in LCi; when carrier i does
not use his full allotment of capacity on a leg, the dual variable corresponding to that leg
must equal 0. Similarly, (26) enforces the complementary slackness condition for constraint
(13) in LCi; when a load is not fully delivered, the dual variable corresponding to that
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load must equal 0. Intuitively, it makes sense to restrict the capacity exchange prices ce to
non-negative values; this assumption is reflected in (27).
Because the parameters of interest, the capacity exchange prices ce, appear only in
the constraints of the inverse problem (InvLCi), it follows that our interest in the inverse
problem is in finding a set of prices ce and dual variables πi, αi, and βi that will make
the set of constraints in the inverse problem feasible. Any vector ce that, together with
(πi, αi, βi), satisfies the constraints of InvLCi will make f∗ optimal for LCi. Thus, to
ensure f∗ is optimal for every carrier, we must find one common vector c and dual vectors
(πi, αi, βi) that satisfy InvLCi for every carrier i. Let InvLC be the constraint set created
by combining the constraints of InvLCi over all carriers i.
Theorem 1. A feasible solution (πi, αi, βi, and c) to InvLC is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Associate dual variables f (o,d,i)(u,v) and y
(o,d,i) with constraints (20)-(21) and (22), re-































(u,v) ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E, ∀i ∈ N (32)







(u,v) ≤ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E (34)
f
(o,d,i)





(u,v) unr. ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L, (u, v) ∈ E : f
∗(o,d,i)
(u,v) > 0
y(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) = 0
y(o,d,i) unr. ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) > 0.
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Equations (29)-(31) are associated with π(o,d,i)v , (32) with αi(u,v), (33) with β
(o,d,i), and
(34) with c(u,v). Assuming all load revenues r(o,d,i) are non-negative, (33) implies that the
objective function (28) is bounded. Furthermore, the solution y = f = 0 is clearly feasible.
Because the dual is bounded and feasible, InvLC must also be feasible.
2.4.2 The Inverse Problem Under the Strict Control Model
As in the Limited Control model, the inverse problem under the Strict Control model is
based on the dual of the Strict Control model for carrier i. The constraints of this dual,
DStricti, can be obtained by adding the following constraints to DLCi:
πi,(o,d,j)v − πi,(o,d,j)u + αi(u,v) ≥ c(u,v) ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ Ei (35)
πi,(o,d,j)v − πi,(o,d,j)u + αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li, (u, v) /∈ Ei (36)
πi,(o,d,j)o − πi,(o,d,j)d + βi,(o,d,j) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li. (37)
In addition, (23) and (24) are constrained over all (o, d, i) ∈ L. When carrier i operates leg
(u, v) he receives capacity exchange price c(u,v) for each unit of load (o, d, j) transported on
(u, v), since carrier j must pay for the use of carrier i’s capacity. As a result, the right-hand
sides of (35) are c(u,v). When carrier i does not operate leg (u, v), he neither receives nor
pays for the transportation of load (o, d, j); correspondingly, the right-hand sides of (36)
are 0. The right-hand sides for (37) reflect that carrier i receives no direct revenue from
delivery of load (o, d, j).
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The inverse problem InvStricti is formulated as follows:
(InvStricti) :









0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ Ei (38)









c(u,v) ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ Ei (39)









−c(u,v) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) /∈ Ei (40)









0 ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li, (u, v) /∈ Ei (41)









r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (42)









0 ∀(o, d, j) /∈ Li (43)





(u,v) < k(u,v) (44)
βi,(o,d,i) = 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) < d(o,d,i) (45)
πi,(o,d,i)v ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (46)
αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E (47)
βi,(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L (48)
c(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E (49)
where the constraints (38)-(41) hold with equality for every (o, d, i) ∈ L, (u, v) ∈ E :
f
∗(o,d,i)




In order to ensure f∗ is optimal for all individual problems Stricti, we combine the
constraints InvStricti over all carriers, obtaining InvStrict, and search for a feasible set of
capacity exchange prices. That a feasible solution to InvStrict must exist can be confirmed
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by examining a result in [2], in which a multi-commodity flow game with multiple owners on
an edge is studied. It is proved that edge prices must exist that satisfy a problem formulated
by aggregating the inverse problem of each owner. Because the carrier alliance game is a
simplified version of the multi-commodity flow game in [2], the result follows.
2.4.3 Example: Finding Capacity Exchange Prices
In this section we present an example to illustrate feasible exchange prices under each model
presented in Section 2.3, and the resulting profit allocations. Characteristics of allocations
obtained using the Limited and Strict Control models will be discussed in detail in Section
2.5.
Figure 3 illustrates the alliance network; carrier A operates legs (1, 3) and (2, 4), each
with one unit of capacity. (The capacity on the ground edges (1, 2) and (3, 4) is unlimited.)
The set of loads is described in Table 2. The unique centralized optimal solution is to deliver
load (1, 4, B) using leg (1, 3) and ground edge (3, 4), and to deliver load (2, 4, C) using let








(2,4) = 1, and all
other variables are zero. The optimality of this solution can be confirmed by solving the




Figure 3: Alliance Network for Allocation Example
Table 2: Loads for Allocation Example
Demand Per-Unit Revenue (r(o,d,k)) Size (d(o,d,k))
(1, 3, A) 2 1
(2, 4, A) 2 1
(1, 4, B) 6 1
(2, 4, C) 3 1
The Limited Control model for carrier A is presented below, with the associated dual
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variables defined next to each constraint. The capacity on legs (1, 3) and (2, 4) is fully
utilized by carriers B and C in the centralized optimal solution; consequently, carrier A is
allotted no capacity on these legs.


















f (o,d,A)e ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ {(1, 3), (4, 2)}
(βA,(o,d,A)) f (o,d,A)(d,o,A) ≤ d(o,d,A) ∀(o, d, A) ∈ LA
f (o,d,A)e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, A) ∈ LA.
LCB and LCB are formulated in a similar manner. The inverse problem InvLC is for-
mulated using the duals of LCA, LCB, and LCC together with complementary slackness
conditions. The constraints comprising InvLC are as follows:
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(InvLC) : π(1,3,A)3 − π(1,3,A)1 + αA(1,3) ≥ 0
π
(2,4,A)
4 − π(2,4,A)2 + αA(2,4) ≥ 0
π
(1,4,B)
2 − π(1,4,B)1 ≥ 0
π
(1,4,B)
3 − π(1,4,B)1 + αB(1,3) = −c(1,3)
π
(1,4,B)
4 − π(1,4,B)2 + αB(2,4) ≥ −c(2,4)
π
(1,4,B)
4 − π(1,4,B)3 = 0
π
(2,4,C)
4 − π(2,4,C)2 + αC(2,4) = −c(2,4)
π
(1,3,A)
1 − π(1,3,A)3 + β(1,3,A) ≥ 2
π
(2,4,A)
2 − π(2,4,A)4 + β(2,4,A) ≥ 2
π
(1,4,B)
1 − π(1,4,B)4 + β(1,4,B) = 0
π
(2,4,C)
2 − π(2,4,C)4 + β(2,4,C) = 0
β(1,3,A) = 0
β(2,4,A) = 0
π, α, β, c ≥ 0.
Note that the constraints and dual variables associated with ground edges (1,2) and (3,4)
have been excluded from LCi and InvLC; since ground edges have infinite capacity, the
dual variables associated with these edges must always be zero.
The capacity exchange prices c(1,3) = 6, c(2,4) = 3 are one feasible solution to InvLC
(this can be verified by solving InvLC with the objective function max c(1,4) + c(2,4)). The








sB = −c(1,3)f (1,4,B)(1,3) − c(2,4)f
(1,4,B)
(2,4) (51)
sC = −c(2,4)f (2,4,C)(2,4) (52)
which simplify to sA = 9, sB = −6, and sC = −3. The carriers also receive direct revenue qi
from delivering loads: qA = 0, qB = 6, qC = 3. Recall that the profit xi allocated to carrier
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i is the sum of qi and si. The capacity exchange prices c(1,3) = 6, c(2,4) = 3 therefore result
in the following allocations: xA = 9, xB = 0, xC = 0.
When using the Strict Control model, capacity exchange prices are found by solving
the constraints InvStrict. StrictA is presented below, with the associated dual variables
defined next to each constraint:
























f (o,d,j)e ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ {(1, 3), (2, 4)}
(βA,(1,3,A)) f (o,d,i)(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, j) ∈ L.
While the constraints for StrictB and StrictC are identical to those of StrictA, the dual
variables π, α, and β have superscripts B and C, respectively, in the place of A. The
objective functions are as follows:





(StrictC) : max 3f (2,4,C)(4,2,C) − c(2,4)f
(2,4,C)
(2,4) .
The inverse problem for carrier A, InvStrictA, is formulated using the dual of StrictA






3 − πA,(1,3,A)1 + αA(1,3) ≥ 0
π
A,(2,4,A)
4 − πA,(2,4,A)2 + αA(2,4) ≥ 0
π
A,(1,4,B)
2 − πA,(1,4,B)1 ≥ 0
π
A,(1,4,B)
3 − πA,(1,4,B)1 + αA(1,3) = c(1,3)
π
A,(1,4,B)
4 − πA,(1,4,B)2 + αA(2,4) ≥ c(2,4)
π
A,(1,4,B)
4 − πA,(1,4,B)3 = 0
π
A,(2,4,C)
4 − πA,(2,4,C)2 + αA(2,4) = c(2,4)
π
A,(1,3,A)
1 − πA,(1,3,A)3 + βA,(1,3,A) ≥ 2
π
A,(2,4,A)
2 − πA,(2,4,A)4 + βA,(2,4,A) ≥ 2
π
A,(1,4,B)
1 − πA,(1,4,B)4 + βA,(1,4,B) = 0
π
A,(2,4,C)
2 − πA,(2,4,C)4 + βA,(2,4,C) = 0
βA,(1,3,A) = 0
βA,(2,4,A) = 0
π, α, β, c ≥ 0.
To obtain InvStrictB, replace πA,(o,d,i)v with π
B,(o,d,i)




βB,(o,d,i). Furthermore, the vector of right-hand sides for equations (53)-(53) becomes
[0, 0, 0,−c(1,3),−c(2,4), 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0]. Similarly, to obtain InvStrictC replace πA,(o,d,i)v
with πC,(o,d,i)v , αA(u,v) with α
C
(u,v), and β
A,(o,d,i) with βC,(o,d,i). The right-hand side vector for
InvStrictC is [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−c(2,4), 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0].
InvStrict is formed by combining the constraints of InvStrictA, InvStrictB, and
InvStrictC . One feasible set of capacity exchange prices is c(1,3) = c(2,4) = 2, which
can be verified by adding the objective function min c(1,3) + c(2,4) and solving InvStrict to
optimality. The side payments si are computed according to equations (50)-(52), which now
simplify to sA = 4, sB = −2, sC = −2. The direct revenue from delivering loads is not de-
pendent on the behavioral model employed, and therefore remains qA = 0, qB = 6, qC = 3.
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Thus the allocations resulting from the capacity exchange prices c(1,3) = c(2,4) = 2 are as
follows: xA = 4, xB = 4, xC = 1.
It is an interesting observation that the set of capacity exchange prices in which c(1,3) =
c(2,4) = 2 is feasible for InvLC, which implies that the allocation xA = 4, xB = 4, xC = 1
may also be obtained when using the Limited Control model. However, the set in which
c(1,3) = 6, c(2,4) = 3 is not feasible for InvStrict, implying that the allocation xA = 9, xB =
0, xC = 0 may only be obtained when using the Limited Control model. Differences in
allocations obtained using the two models will be characterized for the general case in the
following section.
2.5 Comparison of Models
Having established two distinct models for the behavior of an individual carrier within the
system and the methodology for obtaining capacity exchange prices using each of the models,
we now focus on the characteristics of allocations obtained using each model. What are the
advantages and disadvantages of the Strict and Limited Control models? Qualitatively, it
can be argued that the Limited Control model offers a more realistic view of the decisions
available to an individual carrier. Quantitatively, this section focuses on analyzing the
allocations obtained under each model to determine their respective ability to ensure alliance
optimal behavior is attained. This analysis will be conducted from the perspective of (1)
centralized feasibility, (2) cooperative game theory, and (3) secondary markets for capacity.
2.5.1 Centralized Feasibility
In this section we demonstrate that when using the Strict Control model, the aggregated
individual solutions may be suboptimal or even infeasible from the centralized perspective.
In contrast, centralized feasibility is guaranteed under the Limited Control model. The
inability to ensure feasibility of the aggregation of the individual solutions obtained when
each carrier solves Stricti for a given set of capacity exchange prices is an obvious limitation
of the Strict Control model. It is perhaps counterintuitive, as one might expect that as the
level of control represented in a given model increases, the ability to produce the desired
action (in this case, behavior consistent with the alliance optimal solution) would also
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increase. Instead we find that it is exactly this increased control on the part of an individual
carrier that leads to behavior inconsistent with the centralized solution.
Theorem 2. Given a set of capacity exchange prices feasible for InvStrict, it is possible
that optimal solutions exist for Stricti that create infeasibility in the centralized setting.
Proof. This proof is by counterexample. Consider the simple system depicted in Figure 4
in which carrier A operates a leg with origin o, destination d, and capacity 2. Each carrier
has one associated load, described in Table 3. For example, load (o, d, A) represents a load
associated with carrier A, with ready time and origin location corresponding to node o, and
delivery deadline and destination corresponding to node d.
d
o
Figure 4: Alliance Network for Feasibility Example




(o, d,A) 2 1
(o, d,B) 1 2







(o,d) = 1. The constraints for the inverse problem under the Strict
Control model are written below, with the primal variable corresponding to each constraint
indicated to the left of the constraint:
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(InvStrict) :
(f (o,d,A)(o,d) ) π
A,(o,d,A)
d − πA,(o,d,A)o + αA(o,d) = 0
(f (o,d,A)(d,o) ) π
A,(o,d,A)
o − πA,(o,d,A)d + βA,(o,d,A) = 2
(fB(o,d)) π
A,(o,d,B)
d − πA,(o,d,B)o + αA(o,d) = c(o,d)
(fB(d,o)) π
A,(o,d,B)
o − πA,(o,d,B)d = 0
(f (o,d,A)(o,d) ) π
B,(o,d,A)
d − πB,(o,d,A)o + αB(o,d) = 0
(f (o,d,A)(d,o) ) π
B,(o,d,A)
o − πB,(o,d,A)d + βB,(o,d,A) = 0
(fB(o,d)) π
B,(o,d,B)
d − πB,(o,d,B)o + αB(o,d) = −c(o,d)
(fB(d,o)) π
B,(o,d,B)
o − πB,(o,d,B)d = 1.
The only value of c(o,d) that is feasible for InvStrict is c(o,d) = 1. Now consider the Strict
Control model for carrier B, written in standard form:









































f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0
sj ≥ 0 ∀(j = 1..7).
From (53), if f (o,d,B)(d,o,B) > f
(o,d,B)
(o,d) then s
3 < 0. Similarly, from (54), if f (o,d,B)(d,o,B) < f
(o,d,B)
(o,d) then
s4 < 0. Because sj must be nonnegative, it follows that f (o,d,B)(d,o,B) = f
(o,d,B)
(o,d) in any feasible
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solution to StrictB, which then implies that all feasible solutions have an objective function
value of 0.
Consider the following solutions:






(o,d) = 1, s
7 = 1, s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 = s5 = s6 = 0;
S2: f (o,d,A)(d,o,A) = f
(o,d,A)




(o,d) = 2, s
6 = 1, s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 = s5 = s7 = 0.
We claim that S1 and S2 are basic feasible solutions, and it follows that each of these
solutions is an optimal solution that may be obtained by using a standard LP solver such as
CPLEX. Assuming carrier i will implement only those decisions pertaining to his associated
loads, the aggregate alliance solution is formed by retaining the optimal value of f (o,d,i)
from Stricti, while the optimal value of f (o,d,j) from Stricti is ignored. The unique optimal






(o,d) = 1; therefore the contribution
of carrier A to the aggregate solution is f (o,d,A)(d,o,A) = f
(o,d,A)
(o,d) = 1. The contribution of carrier
B based on S1 is f (o,d,B)(d,o,B) = f
(o,d,B)
(o,d) = 1; S1 therefore leads to an aggregate solution which





(o,d) = 2, which implies an aggregate solution in which load (o, d,A) and both
units of load (o, d, B) are delivered. This aggregate solution is infeasible from the centralized
perspective because it requires three units of capacity on leg (o, d).
It remains to prove our claim that S1 and S2 are basic feasible solutions. Given a
system of linear equations Ax = b, where A is m x n, x is n x 1, b is m x 1, and n ≥ m, a
basic solution can be obtained by setting n−m variables equal to zero and solving for the
remaining m variables, assuming that the columns in A corresponding to the m variables
are linearly independent [31]. Any basic solution in which all variables are nonnegative is a
basic feasible solution.
The constraints of StrictB, excluding the nonnegativity constraints, can be written in
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1 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0








































Let B be an m x m matrix made up of m linearly independent columns of A, xB be an
m x 1 vector containing the variables corresponding to the columns in B, and xN be an
(n−m) x 1 vector containing the remaining n−m variables. Then xB = B−1b,xN = 0 is
a basic solution.
We will now examine the solutions S1 and S2 and verify that each is a basic solution.
For each solution, we state the vector of basic variables (xB) and the basis matrix B which
contains the columns of A corresponding to the variables in xB. To verify that B has m
linearly independent columns, we calculate the determinant of B; det(B) 6= 0 if and only if
the columns of B are linearly independent [7]. Finally, we calculate the value of the basic
























1 −1 0 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1



































0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0















Finally, note that for each solution, the values of the basic variables are nonnegative. Since
the values of the non-basic variables are also nonnegative, we conclude that each of the
solutions is a basic feasible solution.
Due to the possibility of multiple optimal solutions for Stricti, there is no guarantee
that carrier i will behave in accordance with the centralized solution, even when there is a
single set of exchange prices c that is feasible for InvStrict. A set of basic feasible solutions
must exist that are optimal, and therefore also feasible, from the centralized perspective.
However, there is no clear way to ensure that these basic feasible solutions will be obtained,
since it is not known in general which objective function can be used. The inability to
ensure centralized feasibility is clearly a practical limitation of the Strict Control model;
in contrast, we show in the following theorem that the Limited Control model can in fact
ensure that centralized feasibility is maintained.
Theorem 3. Any solution obtained using the Limited Control model is feasible from the
centralized perspective.
Proof. A flow balance constraint for load (o, d, i) and node v is contained in LCi, ∀(o, d, i) ∈
L, v ∈ V . Because a solution feasible for InvLC satisfies the flow balance constraints
(11) ∀i ∈ N , all flow balance constraints (2) in the Centralized model C are satisfied.
Similarly, the demand constraint f (o,d,i)(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) is contained in LCi, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L, and
a feasible solution for InvLC satisfies the demand constraints (13) ∀i ∈ N . Consequently,
the demand constraints (4) are satisfied. Non-negativity must be satisfied by all variables
in LCi, ∀i ∈ N ; non-negativity is therefore satisfied in the centralized case as well. Finally,
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the Limited Control model employs capacity restrictions kie for each carrier i and leg e that




e ≤ ke. We therefore conclude that (3) must also be
satisfied, and every aggregate solution obtained using the Limited Control model will be
feasible from the centralized perspective.
We have shown that from the practical standpoint of ensuring feasibility of an aggregate
solution, it is advantageous to use the Limited Control model. This conclusion was reached
by evaluating the optimal solution for individual carriers, assuming they are already partic-
ipating in an alliance. In the following discussion we evaluate the potential of each model
to ensure that all carriers will in fact choose to participate.
2.5.2 Comparing Allocations Using Cooperative Game Theory
In this section we compare the allocations, rather than acceptance and routing decisions,
obtained using each model. It it is important to understand how an allocation is perceived
by alliance members. Is the allocation for carrier i enough to convince him to participate in
the alliance? Are certain allocations perceived to be better than others by some members of
the alliance? The concepts of cooperative game theory provide a framework for measuring
and comparing the benefits of various allocations.
In a cooperative game, rational agents attempt to maximize their individual benefit in a
setting in which cooperation among agents is allowed. An alliance in which carriers make
and receive payments for the use of capacity fits into the structure of a cooperative game
with transferrable payoffs, or a game in which participants are allowed to exchange utility
among each other; in the carrier alliance setting payoffs take the form of money and are
transferred via capacity exchange prices. An outcome of a cooperative game is described by
an allocation of benefits to each participant; in the carrier alliance game the allocation xi
is comprised of direct revenue from delivering loads plus the net sum of capacity exchange
prices paid and received. Of particular interest is the notion of the core, which is the set of
allocations that are (i) budget-balanced, meaning that all benefits are allocated, and (ii)
stable, meaning that no subset of participants can benefit by leaving the alliance. Let v(S)
be the total profit that a subset of carriers S can earn on their own; that is, v(S) is the
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optimal objective function value when the centralized problem C is solved for the subset S.
The core is defined as follows:
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) (55)
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N (56)
where (55) is the budget-balance condition and (56) is the stability condition. We call the
subset of stability equations (56) in which |S| = 1 rationality constraints, as they ensure
that each individual carrier will earn at least as much in the alliance as they could earn
operating alone.
Basic cost allocation methods are discussed in [34]; a more detailed discussion about
allocation methods and the core of a cooperative game is available in [24]. Key observations
from these works include that the core of a cooperative game is often empty, and the core
of a game may contain many allocations. Production games based on linear programming
models were studied in [23]; flow games were later specifically considered in [15] and [12].
In [15], networks with a single commodity and capacitated edges owned by players were
studied. It was shown that such problems have a nonempty core. [12] extended these
results into the multi-commodity flow arena by showing that the result applied to networks
with many commodities, but one common source and sink. [2] considers multiple sources
and sinks and multiple owners on an edge.
The properties of a core allocation are clearly desirable for a carrier alliance. We will
ultimately prove in the following discussion that while a core allocation can be obtained
regardless of the individual behavioral model employed, a greater number of core allocations
are feasible under the Limited Control model. We begin by analyzing the relationship of
allocations obtained using the Strict Control model with respect to the set of core alloca-
tions.
First, any set of capacity exchange prices feasible for InvStrict will define an allocation
in the core of the carrier alliance game. A result in [2] proves that for a simple multi-
commodity flow game where every edge has a unique owner, edge prices that satisfy the
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aggregation of the owners’ inverse problems yield an allocation in the core of the multi-
commodity flow game. We can apply this result to InvStrict because the carrier alliance
game in which the Strict Control model is employed is equivalent to the simple multi-
commodity flow game studied. However, as we prove in the following theorem, every core
allocation is not feasible under the Strict Control model.
Theorem 4. The set of feasible capacity exchange prices for the Strict Control model might
exclude some core allocations.
Proof. This proof is by counterexample. Consider the example discussed in Section 2.4.3.
Refer to Figure 3 and Table 2 for the alliance network and load descriptions, respectively.
From equation (51), sB = −c(1,3)f (1,4,B)(1,3) −c(2,4)f
(1,4,B)
(2,4) . Since d
(1,4,B) = 1, it must be true
that f (1,4,B)(1,3) + f
(1,4,B)
(2,4) ≤ 1, which implies sB ≥ min{−c(1,3),−c(2,4)} = −max{c(1,3), c(2,4)}.
Solving InvStrict with an objective function of max c(1,3), an optimal objective function
value of 3 is attained. Solving InvStrict with an objective function of max c(2,4) also yields
an optimal objective function value of 3. Because the maximum feasible value of either leg’s
capacity exchange price is 3, the minimum value of sB under the Strict Control model is -3.
It can be easily verified that the allocation xA = 7, xB = 1, xC = 1 is a core allocation,
as it satisfies equations (55) and (56). Because vA = 0, vB = 6, and vC = 3, in order to
obtain this allocation the capacity exchange prices must lead to the following side payments:
sA = 7, sB = −5, and sC = −2. Since this contradicts the minimum attainable value of sB,
this core allocation cannot be obtained using the Strict Control model.
We will now characterize the relationship between the core of the carrier alliance game
and allocations obtained using the Limited Control model. An important step in accom-
plishing this is establishing the relationship of allocations obtained using the Limited Control
model to those obtained using the Strict Control model, which is described in the following
theorem:
Theorem 5. The set of allocations that may be obtained using the Strict Control model is
a subset of the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Limited Control model.
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Proof. We first show that any set of capacity exchange prices obtained using the Strict
Control model can also be obtained using the Limited Control model. Let |N | = n, and
consider f (o,d,i)(u,v) . Assume, without loss of generality, that leg (u, v) is operated by carrier
j 6= i. In InvStrict, there are exactly n constraints corresponding to f (o,d,i)(u,v) :






























where each equation holds with equality if f∗(o,d,i)(u,v) > 0. Constraint (57) is from InvStrict
i,
constraint (58) is from InvStrictj , and constraint (59) is from InvStrictk, where k /∈ {i, j}.
In InvLC, there is exactly one constraint corresponding to f (o,d,i)(u,v) , which is constraint (57).
























where each equation holds with equality if f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) > 0. Constraint (60) is from InvStrict
i,
while constraint (61) is from InvStrictk, where k 6= i. In InvLC there is only one constraint
corresponding to f (o,d,i)(d,o,i) , which is (60). We conclude that the constraint set InvLC is a
subset of the constraint set InvStrict, which implies that any solution that is feasible for
InvStrict must also be feasible for InvLC. It follows directly that any allocation obtained
under InvStrict can also be obtained under InvLC.
To demonstrate that the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Limited
Control model is not equal to the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Strict
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Control model, consider once again the example used in Section 2.4.3. The set of capacity
exchange prices c(1,3) = 5, c(2,4) = 2 is feasible for InvLC, and results in the allocation
xA = 7, xB = 1, xC = 1. However, it was demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 4 that this
particular allocation cannot be obtained using the Strict Control model. It follows that the
set of allocations obtained using the Strict Control model must be a subset of the set of
allocations obtained using the Limited Control model.
Because of Theorem 5 we know that it is possible to obtain a core allocation using the
Limited Control model. But is one guaranteed a core allocation? We in fact show in the
next theorem that non-core allocations may be obtained when using the Limited Control
model.
Theorem 6. The set of feasible capacity exchange prices for the Limited Control model
define a set of allocations that may contain allocations outside the core.
Proof. The capacity exchange prices c(1,3) = c(2,4) = 0 are a feasible solution for the problem
InvLC corresponding to the example in Section 2.4.3. c(1,3) = c(2,4) = 0 implies sA =
0, sB = 0, sC = 0. The resulting allocation, xA = 0, xB = 6, xC = 3, clearly does not satisfy
the set of stability equations 56, as v(A) = 4, and is therefore not contained in the core.
That one may obtain an allocation outside the core when employing the Limited Control
model is at first disconcerting, as an allocation in which some subset of members is actually
receiving less profit than they could earn on their own is clearly undesirable. However, by
adding stability constraints to InvLC it can be assured that such an allocation will not be
obtained. The number of stability constraints of type (56) required is 2|N | − 1. Based on
the relatively small number of carriers participating in an air cargo alliance (for example,
the SkyTeam Cargo alliance is currently comprised of 8 carriers, while the WOW alliance is
comprised of 4 carriers), the total number of stability constraints will not be prohibitively
large. However, if the enumeration of all stability constraints does become a concern, one
possibility is to incorporate stability constraints for subsets of size m or smaller, where
m < |N |. This is reasonable under the assumption that carriers have limited information
about other carriers participating in the alliance.
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An important consequence of Theorem 5 is the following corollary, which implies that
it is possible to guarantee a core allocation when using the Limited Control model. Let
InvSLC be the model formed by adding stability constraints (56) to InvLC. We refer to
the Limited Control model with this enhancement to the inverse problem as the Stabilized
Limited Control model.
Corollary 7. InvSLC is feasible, and all feasible solutions define a core allocation.
Let {S} be the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Strict Control model,
{L} be the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Limited Control model, and
{C} be the set of core allocations. It has been established thus far that {S} ⊆ {C} and
{S} ⊆ {L}. Theorem 6 shows that {L} * {C}. It is also true that {C} * {L}, which is
demonstrated with the following example.
Consider an example in which a single (o, d) is operated by carrier B and has two units
of capacity. The set of loads is described in Table 4. In this example the notation is changed
to differentiate among multiple loads between origin o and destination d associated with
carrier i.
Table 4: Loads for Infeasible Core Allocation Example
Demand Per-Unit Revenue (r(o,d,k)) Size (d(o,d,k))
(o, d, A1) 2 1
(o, d, A2) 5 1
(o, d, B) 2 1
The centralized optimal solution is to deliver both of the loads associated with carrier A,
for a total revenue of 7 units. The local optimal solution for carrier A (that is, the maximum
revenue carrier A can earn operating alone) is 0, while carrier B can earn 2 units of revenue
by operating alone. Therefore any allocation in which xA ≥ 0, xB ≥ 2, and xA + xB = 7 is
a core allocation. Recall that InvLC is constructed to ensure that for any set of capacity
exchange costs feasible for InvLC, the optimal solution for LCi is to act in accordance with
the alliance optimal solution. It can easily be verified that the maximum feasible value for
co,d = 2, since for any co,d > 2 carrier A will choose to reject load (o, d,A1). It follows that
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xA ≥ 3, and any core allocation in which xA < 3, for example xA = 0, xB = 7, cannot
be obtained using the Limited Control model. (Neither can such an allocation be obtained
under the Strict Control model.)
There are some instances, however, for which the set of allocations that may be obtained
using the Limited Control model is in fact a subset of the core of the carrier alliance game.
Theorem 8 below characterizes conditions that are necessary in order for this to be the
case; these conditions are especially interesting because they imply that in order for the
Limited Control model to produce an allocation that is guaranteed to be in the core of
the carrier alliance game with transferrable payoffs, the carrier alliance game with non-
transferrable payoffs must have a non-empty core as well. (A game with non-transferrable
payoffs corresponds to an alliance in which the allocation for carrier i is equal to the direct
revenue earned by carrier i, or xi = qi ∀i ∈ N .) This is the case because, as is proven below,
a solution in which all capacity exchange prices are zero is always feasible for InvLC.
Theorem 8. Given a set of carriers N , the set of feasible solutions for InvLC defines a
set of allocations that is a subset of the core only if v(S) ≤ ∑i∈S vi ∀S ⊂ N .
Proof. Assume that c = 0 is a feasible solution to InvLC. The allocation xi received by
carrier i is then equal to vi, the amount of revenue carrier i receives by delivering loads




i, then it must also be true that v(S) >
∑
i∈S x
i and x cannot be a core
allocation since it violates (56).
It remains to show that c = 0 is a feasible solution to InvLC. Consider the Limited


















(v,w) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V,∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (62)
∑
(o,d,i)∈Li
f (o,d,i)e ≤ kie ∀e ∈ E (63)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (64)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0. (65)
Let f∗i be the vector of components of f∗ pertaining to the loads of carrier i. That
is, f∗i is comprised of f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) and f
∗(o,d,i)
e , ∀e ∈ E. We know that f∗i is a feasible
solution to LCic=0, since the capacity limits k
i





e ≤ kie. Let f̂ i be an optimal solution to LCic=0, and assume f∗i
is not optimal for LCic=0. f = f̂
i ∪ ⋃j∈N,j 6=i f∗j must be a feasible solution to the cen-


































(d,o,i) , which contradicts the
optimality of f∗. We conclude that f∗i must be optimal for LCic=0.










s.t. π(o,d,i)v − π(o,d,i)u + αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ E (67)
π(o,d,i)o − π(o,d,i)d + β(o,d,i) ≥ r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (68)
π(o,d,i)v ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li (69)
αi(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E (70)
β(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li. (71)
Because LCic=0 has an optimal solution, (namely, f
∗i), DLCic=0 must also have an
optimal solution. Let (π∗i, α∗i, β∗i) be optimal for DLCic=0. Then f
∗i and (π∗i, α∗i, β∗i)




















f (o,d,i)e − kie













π(o,d,i)v − π(o,d,i)u + αi(u,v)
)





π(o,d,i)o − π(o,d,i)d + β(o,d,i) − r(o,d,i)
)
= 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li. (76)
That f∗i and (π∗i, α∗i, β∗i) satisfy (72)-(76) and are feasible for LCic=0 and DLC
i
c=0
implies that f∗i and (π∗i, α∗i, β∗i) must also satisfy the following set of inequalities:
π∗(o,d,i)v − π∗(o,d,i)u + α∗i(u,v) = 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ E : f∗(o,d,i)(u,v) > 0 (77)
π∗(o,d,i)v − π∗(o,d,i)u + α∗i(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li, (u, v) ∈ E : f∗(o,d,i)(u,v) = 0 (78)
π∗(o,d,i)o − π∗(o,d,i)d + β∗(o,d,i) = r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) > 0 (79)
π∗(o,d,i)o − π∗(o,d,i)d + β∗(o,d,i) ≥ r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Li : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) = 0 (80)













 6= 0 (81)













 = 0 (82)


































Inequalities (81) can be eliminated; (62) are flow balance constraints and therefore must
all hold at equality, which implies that the condition for (81) will never be met. It then
follows that inequalities (77)-(86) are equivalent to the constraints of InvLCi when c = 0.
It therefore follows that (π∗i, α∗i, β∗i, c = 0) must be feasible for InvLCi.
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We have shown that c = 0 must be feasible for InvLCi. Because InvLC is constructed
by combining the constraints of InvLCi for all i ∈ N , and the exchange prices c are the only
components common among the constraints InvLCi and InvLCj ,
⋃
i∈N (π
∗i, α∗i, β∗i), c = 0
must be feasible for InvLC.
In addition to those conditions that are necessary for the set of allocations that may be
obtained using the Limited Control model to be a subset of the core, we have also identified
a set of conditions that are sufficient for this to be the case.
Theorem 9. Given a set of carriers N , the set of feasible solutions for InvLC defines a
set of allocations that is a subset of the core if v(S) = 0 ∀S ⊂ N .
Proof. InvLC is constructed such that for any set of exchange costs c that are feasible for






(o, d, i) ∈ L : f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) > 0. (This implies that the per unit cost of delivering a load is more
expensive than the per unit revenue earned by delivering the load.) But then it cannot be
optimal for f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) > 0, since carrier i is better off by not delivering the load at all. Because





e ∀(o, d, i) ∈ L :
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Consider the allocation for carrier i:
























Since c ≥ 0, it follows that xi ≥ 0.
If v(S) = 0 ∀S ∈ N , we must have ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S). We conclude that if v(S) = 0 ∀S ∈
N , then x is a core allocation. (
∑
i∈N x
i = v(N) must be satisfied by optimality of f∗.)
The relationship among the set of allocations that may be obtained using the Limited
and Strict Control models and the core of the carrier alliance game is depicted in Figure 5.
In summary, we have shown that a core allocation can be obtained using either behavioral













Figure 5: General Relationship of Allocations
core allocations than does the solution space for the Strict Control model. Furthermore, even
though it is possible to obtain allocations outside the core when using the Limited Control
model, the model can easily be adapted (to the Stabilized Limited Control model) to ensure
a core allocation is obtained. Thus the Limited Control, model in addition to offering the
practical advantage of centralized feasibility, offers desirable theoretical properties as well.
2.5.3 Secondary Markets for Capacity
In this section we examine the potential for a given set of capacity exchange prices to
create a secondary market for capacity. It is assumed that while capacity exchange prices
are determined up front (by solving the inverse problem InvStrict, InvLC, or InvSLC,
depending on the behavioral model used), carriers do not pay for capacity until it is used.
Furthermore, it is assumed that a carrier is allowed to purchase (from the operator of a
leg) any amount of capacity on the leg up to the amount of capacity used by the carrier
in the centralized optimal solution, but no more. Because carriers are not required to pay
for all capacity up front, the time that elapses between when capacity exchange prices are
set and when capacity is used gives carriers an opportunity exists to exchange information
and determine profitable ways to trade capacity, at the expense of other members of the
alliance. Capacity traded in such a manner is referred to as a secondary market, since
trading occurs after capacity has first been purchased from the leg operator. The initial
exchange of capacity, in which capacity is sold only by the operator of a leg, is referred to
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as the primary market.
Traditionally, secondary markets have been studied in the context of markets for used
goods, such as automobiles and books. Our interpretation here is slightly different, since
the capacity is being sold as “unused” in the secondary market. However, similar to sec-
ondary markets in more traditional applications, we find that understanding the impact of
secondary markets on the overall system is critical to ensure that the system will operate
optimally. After an example illustrating the mechanics of a secondary market and why
the existence of the secondary market is detrimental for the alliance, we will show that a
secondary market can never occur when capacity exchange prices are determined using the
Strict Control model.
Consider an example in which carrier A operates three legs, each with one unit of
capacity. The alliance network is depicted in Figure 6, and load descriptions are given in
Table 5. In the unique centralized optimal solution, load (1, 4, B) is delivered using leg (1, 3)
and ground edge (3, 4), load (2, 4, C) is delivered using ground edge (1, 2) and leg (2, 4),
and load (3, 5, D) is delivered using leg (3, 5). The centralized optimal revenue is $10. The
capacity exchange prices c(1,3) = 6, c(2,4) = 3, c(3,5) = 1 are feasible for InvLC, which can
be verified by solving InvLC with the objective function max c(1,3) + c(2,4) + c(3,5). These





Figure 6: Alliance Network for Secondary Market Example
Assume that carrier B and carrier C exchange information about their respective loads,
which leads carrier B to realize that rather than paying carrier A $6 for a unit of capacity
on leg (1, 3), he can instead offer carrier C $y for a unit of capacity on leg (2, 4), where
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Table 5: Loads for Secondary Market Example
Demand Per-Unit Revenue (r(o,d,k)) Size (d(o,d,k))
(1, 5, A) 3 1
(2, 4, A) 2 1
(1, 4, B) 6 1
(2, 4, C) 3 1
(3, 5, D) 1 1
$3 < y < $6. This sale of capacity from carrier B to carrier C, if executed, occurs in the
secondary market, since the capacity in question has already been purchased from carrier
A at a price of $3. The resulting allocations realized by the carriers after this exchange are
given in Table 6.
Table 6: Allocations After Secondary Market Exchange
Carrier
Direct Capacity Net Value of Allocation
Revenue Sold/Purchased Exchange Prices (si) (xi)
A 0 (2,4) and (3,5) sold 3 + 1 4
B 6 (2,4) purchased from C -y 6-y
C 0
(2,4) purchased from A,
-3+y -3+y
sold to C
D 1 (3,5) purchased from A -1 0
Secondary markets are clearly detrimental for the owner of capacity that is unsold
because of a trade in the secondary market, in this case the capacity on leg (1, 3). In fact,
in this example carrier A will earn less revenue than he could earn by operating alone, which
implies that the alliance will not be sustainable because carrier A should not continue to
participate. Our original analysis, however, which considered the primary market only,
predicted the allocations xA = 10, xB = xC = xD = 0, which is in fact a core allocation
and therefore stable in the game-theoretic sense.
Observation 1. Capacity exchange prices may lead to a secondary market even when the
allocation predicted by analysis of the primary market is a core allocation.
The implication of this observation is that traditional game theoretic tools alone are not
enough to evaluate the sustainability of an alliance. Because secondary markets lead to
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behavior that is suboptimal for the alliance, it is valuable to understand how they can be
prevented. In the following theorem we show that capacity exchange prices obtained using
the Strict Control model never lead to a (profitable) secondary market for capacity.
Theorem 10. Given a set of capacity exchange prices feasible for InvStrict, a profitable
secondary market for capacity will not exist.
Proof. In order for a capacity exchange in the secondary market to be profitable for the
seller of capacity on leg (u, v), he must be able to sell (u, v) for a price c(u,v), where c(u,v) >
c(u,v). Let f ′ represent the aggregate solution once a secondary capacity exchange has









(u,v) > 0. InvStrict is constructed such that for any set of exchange costs c
feasible for InvStrict, f∗ is optimal for Stricti. Because f ′ is feasible for the centralized
model C, it must also be feasible for Stricti, which implies that, for Stricti, the objective





(u,v) units of capacity are purchased at cost






units of capacity are purchased at cost c(u,v). Since purchasing δ more units of capacity on
leg (u, v) at cost c(u,v) is not beneficial for carrier i, neither can it be beneficial for carrier i
to purchase δ units of capacity on leg (u, v) at a cost which is greater than c(u,v). Because
c(u,v) > c(u,v), it therefore cannot be beneficial for carrier i to purchase capacity on the
secondary market. Given that it is never beneficial for a carrier to purchase capacity in the
secondary market, we conclude that a profitable secondary market will not exist.
Essentially, secondary markets are prevented under the Strict Control model because
any solution feasible for the alliance is feasible for Stricti. This is not the case, however, for
LCi; capacity restrictions kie in LC
i render infeasible any solution that uses more capacity
on leg e than what is used by carrier i in the centralized optimal solution. The opportunity
to purchase capacity in the secondary market effectively increases kie, which creates a larger
solution space for LCi. Because the feasible region for LCi changes when capacity is
purchased on the secondary market, it is possible for these purchases to be profitable.
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2.6 Summary
A tradeoff has now been established between the Limited Control and Strict Control models.
Not only does the Limited Control model ensure that centralized feasibility is maintained,
but it also affords a much larger solution space for capacity exchange prices, and therefore
more flexibility in allocations which may be obtained under the model. This flexibility,
however, may lead to secondary markets, which create opportunities for behavior that is
not optimal for the alliance as a whole. The Strict Control model, meanwhile, is able to
prevent the emergence of secondary markets, but in so doing, greatly restricts the range of
allocations that are possible. In addition, centralized feasibility cannot be guaranteed.
In the next chapter experimental results are presented for alliances comprised of various
types of carriers. For each alliance, the Strict Control model, Limited Control model, and
Stabilized Limited Control model are each used to determine capacity exchange prices.
Analysis of the resulting allocations demonstrates that the mechanism behaves as predicted
with regard to the characteristics of allocations obtained under each model. However, it will
also become evident that more influence over the allocations obtained is needed, inspiring an
investigation into how fairness may be incorporated into the mechanism, which is the subject
of Chapter 4. The tradeoffs between the Limited and Strict Control models will present
themselves again in this chapter; depending on how fairness is defined, a fair allocation may
lie outside the range of allocations feasible for the Strict Control model. In such a case, it
may benefit the alliance to contractually prohibit the selling of capacity by anyone other
than the operator of the leg. This effectively eliminates secondary markets while leaving the




COMPUTATIONAL STUDY OF CARRIER COMPATIBILITY
The primary goal of this chapter is to gain an empirical understanding of carrier compati-
bility. To this end, we examine three sets of experiments designed to investigate the benefit
to be gained by collaborating in a variety of alliance circumstances. The first two sets of
experiments are a general study of how the network size and fleet capacity of the partnering
carriers impact the alliance; in the first set of experiments all carrier hubs are connected,
while in the second set the impact of network integration and complementarity among part-
nering carriers is also investigated. The third set of experiments is an empirical analysis of
the compatibility of carriers currently involved in the WOW cargo alliance.
The first section of this chapter describes how data is generated for the first two sets
of experiments. The results and insights pertaining to alliances in which the networks
of partnering carriers are fully integrated are presented in Section 3.2, while results and
analysis for alliances in which network integration varies are discussed in Section 3.3. The
experimental procedure, results, and insights pertaining to the WOW alliance are described
in Section 3.4.
3.1 Data Generation
Using data publicly available from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics [9], we identified
5 classes of combination carriers. The data set used was the “T-100 Segment (All Carriers)”
from July 2006; the description of the data set is as follows:
This table combines domestic and international T-100 segment data reported
by U.S. and foreign air carriers, and contains non-stop segment data by aircraft
type and service class for transported passengers, freight and mail, available
capacity, scheduled departures, departures performed, aircraft hours, and load
factor...[9]
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where “freight” excludes all passenger baggage. The data was filtered to select only domes-
tic data for US carriers (that is, flight segments operated by US-owned carriers for which
both endpoints of the segment lie within the United States or US-owned territories). Fur-
thermore, only segments of service class “F” (scheduled passenger and/or cargo service)
were considered.
Our goal was to identify classes of carriers based on network size and capacity of fleet.
To accomplish this, for each carrier the sum over all segments flown by that carrier was
calculated for the following statistics: number of scheduled departures for the segment,
number of passengers transported on the segment, and the amount of freight (in pounds)
transported on the segment. In addition, the number of distinct (origin, destination) pairs
was calculated for each carrier. In order to ensure that primarily combination carriers were
represented in the sample, the results were filtered to retain only those carriers performing
more than 1000 departures, delivering more than 10,000 passengers, delivering more than
100,000 pounds of freight, and maintaining an average of more than 15 passengers per depar-
ture. (Average passengers per departure for a carrier = sum of passengers flown during monthsum of departures performed during month .)
The resulting data is presented in Table 7.
Based on the information in Table 7, classifications for network size and fleet capacity
were determined. Network size is approximated by the number of (origin, destination) pairs
served by a carrier, while fleet capacity is approximated by the average number of passengers
per departure. For each classification listed in Tables 8(a) and 8(b), the range (from Table
7) represented by the classification is described in the second column.
Using these classifications, we obtain the 5 general classes of carriers in Table 9. These
carrier classes were used to generate carriers for the experiments described in Sections 3.2
and 3.3. In the following discussion, the procedure for generating the network and loads
associated with each carrier is described.
Each carrier operates a pure hub-and-spoke network, in which the network size and
fleet capacity are scaled to reflect, approximately, the relative size relationships among
the classes. The number of hubs depends on the size of the carrier; carriers with a large,
medium, and small network size operate 3, 2, and 1 hubs, respectively. The number of spoke
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Table 7: Selected Carrier Data Obtained Using BTS Segment Data
Carrier Name Total Total Total Total Passengers(o,d) pairs Departures Passengers Freight per Departure
AirTran Airways 100 12,752 1,241,375 1,087,916 97.3
Alaska Airlines 165 14,400 1,556,547 10,168,571 108.1
Aloha Airlines 16 4,082 295,147 439,085 72.3
America West Airlines 187 16,583 1,876,737 3,225,398 113.2
American Airlines 366 47,466 6,286,265 27,795,820 132.4
American Eagle Airlines 278 34,535 1,221,852 130,591 35.4
ATA Airlines 20 1,053 154,963 206,477 147.2
Atlantic Southeast Airlines 292 22,991 997,246 257,137 43.4
Comair 225 15,153 609,590 117,013 40.2
Continental Air Lines 345 26,585 3,223,248 12,657,114 121.2
Delta Air Lines 506 41,679 5,784,421 31,561,559 138.8
Era Aviation 49 2,709 40,763 159,867 15.0
Expressjet Airlines 278 28,259 1,093,912 247,095 38.7
Frontier Airlines 71 7,338 797,671 1,738,511 108.7
Hawaiian Airlines 40 4,797 562,193 5,067,573 117.2
Horizon Air 152 13,452 572,053 813,321 42.5
JetBlue Airways 16 1,896 267,163 116,484 140.9
Mesa Airlines 147 9,335 521,621 164,424 55.9
Mesaba Airlines 190 11,428 322,328 135,748 28.2
Midwest Airline 41 3,576 291,675 600,215 81.6
Northwest Airlines 424 36,079 4,144,176 6,713,743 114.9
PSA Airlines 131 9,944 424,455 177,627 42.7
Southwest Airlines 775 92,766 9,481,851 26,546,173 102.2
United Air Lines 454 41,669 5,330,278 27,239,513 127.9
US Airways 259 23,611 2,696,865 3,923,946 114.2
legs operated by a carrier in class C1 is 12n, the number of spoke legs operated by a carrier
in class C2 or C3 is 5n, and the number of spoke legs operated by a carrier in class C4 or
C5 is n, where n = 5. The origins for spoke legs operated by carrier i are approximately
equally distributed among the hubs operated by carrier i, and every spoke destination is
served by exactly one hub. Spoke legs operated by carriers with small fleet capacity have 2
units of capacity, while carriers with large fleet capacity operate spoke legs with 5 units of
capacity.
The level of integration of the networks of partnering carriers is defined by the number
of hubs that are connected. Further details of integration will be discussed for each set of
experiments. The capacity of inter-hub legs is large enough to ensure that the benefit of
collaborating is not restricted. In this pure hub-and-spoke system, it can easily be seen
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Table 8: Class Descriptions
(a) Network Size
Network # of (o,d)
Size Pairs








Table 9: Carrier Classifications
Class Network Fleet # of Carriers
Size Capacity in Class
C1 large large 4
C2 medium large 5
C3 medium small 8
C4 small large 5
C5 small small 3
that the benefit associated with collaborating increases as the capacity on inter-hub legs
increases, because any load associated with carrier i that has a destination outside the
network of carrier i must travel on an inter-hub leg. It is therefore assumed that carriers
participating in an alliance will increase inter-hub capacity to a level that ensures sufficient
benefit. Furthermore, in order to simplify analysis, the network is generated such that the
decisions about whether to accept a load and how to route that load are dependent solely
on network geography and capacity, and not on time. This is accomplished by orienting
all spoke legs from hub to spoke, and then setting the origin and destination time of every
hub-to-spoke leg as 1 and 2, respectively. Every inter-hub leg has an origin time of 0 and
destination time of 1, and every load as an origin time of 0 and a destination time of 2,
respectively.
The number of loads associated with a carrier is equal to the number of spoke legs
operated by that carrier, which approximates a proportional relationship between the size
of a carrier’s network and the number of cargo loads booked by that carrier. Because any
load originating at a spoke must be transported to the hub of that spoke before it can
be transported anywhere else, the system is simplified by generating the origin of a load
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associated with carrier i randomly from the set of carrier i’s hubs. For each carrier, the
maximum size of a load, Si, is equal to the capacity of that carrier’s legs, and the maximum
per-unit revenue of each load is 3. The size and per-unit revenue of each load associated
with carrier i are generated according to a uniform distribution over the ranges [1, Si] and
[1, 3], respectively. Two classes of freight forwarders are used in the experiments; a large
freight forwarder is represented by class F1, and is associated with 12n loads. A small
freight forwarder is represented by class F2, and is associated with 5n loads. The maximum
sizes of loads associated with forwarders of type F1 and F2 are 5 and 2, respectively.
Obtaining accurate demand distributions is very difficult, and for this reason we test
our mechanism using two different distributions. In the first distribution (D1), a high
proportion of a carrier’s loads have destinations within his network, while in the second
demand distribution (D2) the proportion of loads a carrier can serve using his own network
is low. Let pi represent the probability that the destination of load (o, d, i) is within the
set of destinations reached by spoke legs operated by carrier i. All destinations within the
network of carrier i are equally likely with probability p
spokesi
where spokesi is the number
of spoke legs operated by carrier i. For a load associated with carrier i, all destinations




. Consequently, loads associated with freight forwarders have destinations
that are uniformly distributed throughout the network.
The probability pi is calculated for each demand distribution as follows:
D1: pi = a
i
ai+1




In alliances where only one carrier operates legs (because the remaining partners are
forwarders), pi = 1 for this carrier.
D2: pi = legs
i∑
j∈Nk legs
j where Nk is the group of carriers in instance k.
To aid in analysis, information regarding the distribution of loads for a two-carrier alliance
is contained in Table 10. Note that under demand distribution D1, the probabilities for
Carriers A and B do not sum to 1 across a row; this is because the probability that the
destination of a load associated with Carrier A is in the network of Carrier A is independent
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of the size of Carrier B. On the other hand, under distribution D2, the probability that the
destination of a load associated with Carrier A is in the network of Carrier A is in fact
dependent on the size of Carrier B, and consequently, the probabilities for Carriers A and
B sum to 1.
Table 10: Probability that Load Destination is in Network of Associated Carrier
Distribution D1 Distribution D2
Instance Class Carriers pA pB pA pB
1 C1,C1 12/13 12/13 1/2 1/2
2 C1,C2 12/13 5/6 12/17 5/17
3 C1,C3 12/13 5/6 12/17 5/17
4 C1,C4 12/13 1/2 12/13 1/13
5 C1,C5 12/13 1/2 12/13 1/13
6 C1,F1 1 0 1 0
7 C1,F2 1 0 1 0
8 C2,C2 5/6 5/6 1/2 1/2
9 C2,C3 5/6 5/6 1/2 1/2
10 C2,C4 5/6 1/2 5/6 1/6
11 C2,C5 5/6 1/2 5/6 1/6
12 C2,F1 1 0 1 0
13 C2,F2 1 0 1 0
14 C3,C3 5/6 5/6 1/2 1/2
15 C3,C4 5/6 1/2 5/6 1/6
16 C3,C5 5/6 1/2 5/6 1/6
17 C3,F1 1 0 1 0
18 C3,F2 1 0 1 0
19 C4,C4 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
20 C4,C5 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
21 C4,F1 1 0 1 0
22 C4,F2 1 0 1 0
23 C5,C5 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
24 C5,F1 1 0 1 0
25 C5,F2 1 0 1 0
For each experiment, the results reported for an instance class represent the average from
30 instances generated with the same class parameters. The mechanism was implemented
using C and CPLEX (ver 9.0.0) callable libraries. A solution for an instance was obtained
by (1) solving the centralized problem, (2) solving InvStrict, InvLC, and InvSLC, and
(3) using the resulting capacity exchange prices to calculate the corresponding allocation.
In order to obtain the benefit gained by collaborating, the local problem for each carrier
was solved as well.
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3.2 Analysis of the Impact of Network Size and Fleet Capacity on Al-
liance Success
The goal of this first set of experiments is to explore the benefit to be gained from collabo-
rating for alliances comprised of carriers with various network sizes and fleet capacities. It is
assumed that the alliance is formed by completely integrating the networks of participating
carriers. That is, all alliance hubs are directly connected: there is a leg from each hub of
carrier i to each of hub of carrier j for all pairs of carriers i and j. Figure 7 depicts the
system network for an alliance comprised of one carrier with a large network and one carrier
with a medium network. In this example, carrier A operates all inter-hub leg originating








Figure 7: Integrated Hub-and-Spoke Network
3.2.1 Results and Insights from Two-Carrier Alliances
Rounded results pertaining to the alliance optimal solution are contained in Table 11. The
“Carriers” column indicates the class from which each carrier is selected; in instance class
1, for example, both carriers in the alliance are carriers from class C1. The increase in
system revenue is calculated as the total revenue earned by the alliance minus the sum of
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the revenue each carrier earns by working independently. The percent increase in accepted
loads measures the percent difference in the number of loads that can be completely delivered
in the local (independent) solution for a carrier and the number of loads associated with
that carrier that are completely delivered in the centralized alliance solution. Table 12
contains rounded results pertaining to the allocations received by each carrier. Specifically,
the table shows the benefit each carrier receives by joining the alliance, calculated as the
difference between the allocation for carrier i and the revenue carrier i could earn operating
alone, or xi − v(i).
Table 11: System Revenue and Accepted Loads for Two-Carrier Alliances
Demand Distribution D1 Demand distribution D2
Class
Carriers Chg. in System Chg. in Loads Chg. in System Chg. in Loads
(A,B) Revenue Accepted Revenue Accepted
Actual % A B Actual % A B
1 C1,C1 40.1 7.2% 7.2% 5.9% 266.1 81.6% 72.4% 71.2%
2 C1,C2 33.0 8.4% 6.7% 16.7% 167.2 65.3% 29.7% 242.0%
3 C1,C3 19.6 5.9% 2.2% 12.8% 84.7 34.5% 8.5% 205.0%
4 C1,C4 30.6 10.2% 6.2% 62.7% 42.3 14.7% 5.8% 1018.2%
5 C1,C5 14.6 4.9% 1.9% 44.9% 24.1 8.3% 1.7% 861.5%
6 C1,F1 206.4 68.0% -24.2% N/A 206.4 68.0% -24.2% N/A
7 C1,F2 55.1 18.2% -6.5% N/A 55.1 18.2% -6.5% N/A
8 C2,C2 33.6 15.3% 14.5% 14.7% 113.4 79.7% 64.9% 81.0%
9 C2,C3 17.8 11.3% 3.6% 18.1% 60.8 62.8% 18.3% 91.3%
10 C2,C4 33.6 28.9% 14.2% 88.5% 42.3 39.0% 13.5% 568.4%
11 C2,C5 15.3 13.2% 4.4% 86.4% 19.9 17.7% 3.8% 535.0%
12 C2,F1 157.9 124.8% -44.7% N/A 157.9 124.8% -44.7% N/A
13 C2,F2 54.1 43.9% -16.2% N/A 54.1 43.9% -16.2% N/A
14 C3,C3 16.3 15.8% 15.8% 14.5% 54.5 82.9% 72.5% 73.7%
15 C3,C4 18.7 29.3% 20.2% 26.8% 22.6 41.1% 18.7% 126.1%
16 C3,C5 13.0 22.3% 15.1% 36.6% 18.6 35.0% 14.1% 409.5%
17 C3,F1 79.6 134.9% -56.8% N/A 79.6 134.9% -56.8% N/A
18 C3,F2 35.0 60.7% -28.0% N/A 35.0 60.7% -28.0% N/A
19 C4,C4 23.4 90.1% 58.8% 78.0% 23.4 90.1% 58.8% 78.0%
20 C4,C5 11.1 52.0% 10.4% 55.7% 11.1 52.0% 10.4% 55.7%
21 C4,F1 48.0 185.7% -95.5% N/A 48.0 185.7% -95.5% N/A
22 C4,F2 33.2 116.9% -59.8% N/A 33.2 116.9% -59.8% N/A
23 C5,C5 9.8 72.9% 66.7% 65.6% 9.8 72.9% 66.7% 65.6%
24 C5,F1 17.7 147.4% -98.2% N/A 17.7 147.4% -98.2% N/A




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analyzing the results in Tables 11 and 12, we obtain several observations and insights:
• Not surprisingly, the benefit associated with collaborating increases as the probability
that a load can be served by its associated carrier decreases. Note that when the
benefit under distribution D2 is not higher than the benefit under distribution D1,
it is an instance in which the probability that a load can be served by its associated
carrier is the same under both distributions.
• The benefit associated with collaborating, measured by the increase in system revenue,
increases with the size of the network and fleet capacity. Under demand distribution
D1 there are slightly diminishing returns, as the percentage increase in profit declines
as network size and fleet capacity increase, while under distribution D2, the percentage
increase in profit increases with network and fleet size. Thus we conclude that the
marginal benefit associated with increasing network and fleet sizes in collaborating
partners increases as the proportion of loads that a carrier can serve using only his
network decreases.
• Under distribution D1, fleet capacity has more impact than network size on the bene-
fit associated with collaborating. Furthermore, a carrier with large fleet capacity does
not experience a significant increase in the number of loads completely accepted for
delivery when collaborating with a carrier with small fleet capacity. These observa-
tions lead to an interesting insight: consider the relationship between a large national
carrier and a smaller subsidiary. If the subsidiary carrier can serve a high proportion
of its own demand (as is the case under demand distribution 1), the parent carrier
stands to benefit more by increasing the fleet size of its subsidiary than by increasing
the size of the subsidiary network.
• The benefit associated with collaborating, measured both by the percentage increase in
the number of loads completely accepted for delivery as well as by an improvement over
v(i), is strictly positive when a carrier collaborates with another carrier. The number
of loads completely accepted strictly decreases, however, for a carrier collaborating
with a freight forwarder. This result suggests that carriers may want to negotiate
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rules regarding priority of the carrier’s loads relative to the forwarder’s loads in order
that the carrier’s customer service level does not decline as a result of entering into
collaboration with a forwarder.
• Given that an allocation in which both carriers receive non-negative benefit is a core
allocation, our proposed allocation mechanism is behaving as expected with regard to
the results of Section 2.5. Namely, every allocation under the Strict Control model
is a core allocation, while for some instances, the Limited Control model yields an
allocation outside the core. Adding stability constraints to the Limited Control model
results in a core allocation.
Although the results confirm that allocations obtained under the Strict and Limited Control
models are as expected with respect to the core, closer inspection reveals that the mecha-
nism can apportion alliance benefit in an arbitrarily disproportionate manner. For example,
under the Limited Control model, the second carrier in the alliance always receives more
benefit, proportionally, than does the first carrier. This behavior occurs because the mech-
anism has been designed to be indifferent when selecting among all feasible settings for the
capacity exchange prices; when implemented using a standard LP solver, therefore, default
pivoting rules will have a large impact on the final solution obtained, in this case resulting
in a tendency to favor the second carrier. Clearly, then, it is desirable for an alliance to
have more control over the allocations obtained when implementing the mechanism; this
can be accomplished by guiding the choice of capacity exchange prices towards those prices
that result in desired allocations. Establishing rules for selecting among feasible capacity
exchange prices, and the adaptation of the mechanism for incorporating these rules, will be
discussed in Chapter 4.
3.2.2 Results and Insights from Three-Carrier Alliances
The results presented for alliances consisting of three carriers pertain only to the system
revenue and loads accepted, which are calculated similarly to the two-carrier case. Table 13
contains rounded results obtained when demand distribution D1 is implemented, while
Table 14 contains the rounded results obtained when distribution D2 is implemented. For
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each instance class, the results reported again represent the average from 30 instances gen-
erated with the same class parameters. Allocation results are omitted because, as discussed
in the previous section, while they demonstrate that the mechanism behaves as predicted,
they can arbitrarily favor one carrier over another. This will be addressed in Chapter 4.
Some observations regarding the experiments with three carrier alliances are as follows:
• Under demand distribution D1, the benefit associated with adding a third carrier to
an existing (or potential) two-carrier alliance varies greatly. For example, when two
carriers of type C5 collaborate, both carriers are helped by the addition of a third
carrier with large fleet capacity. For an alliance comprised of C1 and C4, adding a
third carrier helps C4, but not C1, if the third carrier has a large fleet capacity. Given
an alliance comprised of two C1 carriers, adding a third carrier yields no benefit to
the original two C1 carriers. This result suggests that some pairs of carriers are in fact
better off (in terms of the number of loads accepted) by not adding a third carrier.
• Under distribution D2, it is in general beneficial to all carriers to grow the alliance.
• As in the two carrier experiments, we observe that under distribution D1, higher fleet
capacity seems to yield higher benefits from collaborating than does size of network.
• While the number of loads each carrier accepts does not always decrease when two
carriers collaborate with a freight forwarder, we still observe a dramatic decline in the
number of carrier loads accepted as compared to when two carriers collaborate with
a third carrier.
We also see even more pronouncedly in the three-carrier alliances that collaborating
yields much higher benefits as the proportion of loads that can initially be served entirely
by their associated carrier decreases. This effect, in addition to the first two observations
discussed above, implies that the properties of demand experienced by carriers can greatly
impact how much the carriers can benefit by collaborating. Before evaluating the bene-
fits of a potential alliance or additional partner, therefore, it is important to consider the
characteristics of the demand associated with each carrier.
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Table 13: System Revenue and Accepted Loads for Three-Carrier Alliances (Distribution
D1)
Instance Carriers Chg. in System Chg. in Loads
Class (A, B, C) Revenue Accepted
Actual % A B C
1 C1,C1,C1 57 7% 6% 6% 7%
2 C1,C1,C2 52 8% 7% 4% 14%
3 C1,C1,C3 42 7% 4% 5% 18%
4 C1,C1,C4 48 8% 4% 6% 74%
5 C1,C1,C5 48 8% 6% 5% 126%
6 C1,C1,F1 270 49% -9% -7% N/A
7 C1,C1,F2 97 17% 4% 2% N/A
8 C1,C2,C2 55 11% 5% 15% 12%
9 C1,C2,C3 35 8% 5% 11% 11%
10 C1,C2,C4 43 11% 7% 12% 58%
11 C1,C2,C5 40 10% 5% 13% 98%
12 C1,C2,F1 250 63% -12% -3% N/A
13 C1,C2,F2 89 22% 3% 3% N/A
14 C1,C3,C3 28 7% 2% 16% 12%
15 C1,C3,C4 27 8% 1% 17% 65%
16 C1,C3,C5 25 7% 2% 12% 66%
17 C1,C3,F1 207 60% -16% -19% N/A
18 C1,C3,F2 76 23% -1% 6% N/A
19 C1,C4,C4 42 13% 5% 86% 75%
20 C1,C4,C5 31 10% 4% 71% 61%
21 C1,C4,F1 239 82% -20% 34% N/A
22 C1,C4,F2 84 28% -2% 44% N/A
23 C1,C5,C5 24 8% 1% 83% 89%
24 C1,C5,F1 221 77% -19% 8% N/A
25 C1,C5,F2 71 24% -7% 59% N/A
26 C1,F1,F1 332 111% -39% N/A N/A
27 C1,F1,F2 243 80% -28% N/A N/A
28 C1,F2,F2 108 35% -14% N/A N/A
29 C2,C2,C2 49 15% 14% 11% 14%
30 C2,C2,C3 33 12% 7% 12% 14%
31 C2,C2,C4 46 20% 11% 13% 95%
32 C2,C2,C5 41 19% 11% 15% 116%
33 C2,C2,F1 234 106% -23% -16% N/A
34 C2,C2,F2 95 42% 3% 5% N/A
35 C2,C3,C3 28 13% 6% 15% 13%
36 C2,C3,C4 29 17% 4% 15% 57%
37 C2,C3,C5 22 13% 2% 16% 52%
38 C2,C3,F1 175 110% -26% -27% N/A
39 C2,C3,F2 70 46% -6% -5% N/A
40 C2,C4,C4 40 29% 16% 60% 71%
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – continued from previous page
Instance Carriers Chg. in System Chg. in Loads
Class (A, B, C) Revenue Accepted
Actual % A B C
41 C2,C4,C5 28 21% 9% 33% 85%
42 C2,C4,F1 207 174% -41% -15% N/A
43 C2,C4,F2 90 77% 3% 68% N/A
44 C2,C5,C5 20 16% 5% 105% 76%
45 C2,C5,F1 180 154% -39% 11% N/A
46 C2,C5,F2 66 58% -12% 18% N/A
47 C2,F1,F1 220 170% -66% N/A N/A
48 C2,F1,F2 179 139% -54% N/A N/A
49 C2,F2,F2 98 80% -22% N/A N/A
50 C3,C3,C3 22 15% 13% 11% 14%
51 C3,C3,C4 21 19% 10% 12% 42%
52 C3,C3,C5 20 18% 7% 13% 86%
53 C3,C3,F1 117 118% -35% -30% N/A
54 C3,C3,F2 57 55% -9% -2% N/A
55 C3,C4,C4 26 31% 19% 27% 35%
56 C3,C4,C5 21 28% 10% 62% 60%
57 C3,C4,F1 126 196% -42% -51% N/A
58 C3,C4,F2 58 92% -12% 17% N/A
59 C3,C5,C5 17 25% 16% 49% 59%
60 C3,C5,F1 99 169% -44% -23% N/A
61 C3,C5,F2 52 92% -19% 28% N/A
62 C3,F1,F1 110 190% -79% N/A N/A
63 C3,F1,F2 88 151% -67% N/A N/A
64 C3,F2,F2 58 98% -43% N/A N/A
65 C4,C4,C4 36 94% 90% 76% 103%
66 C4,C4,C5 22 66% 31% 53% 63%
67 C4,C4,F1 129 540% -56% -39% N/A
68 C4,C4,F2 66 219% 22% 3% N/A
69 C4,C5,C5 18 62% 13% 67% 76%
70 C4,C5,F1 94 434% -66% -53% N/A
71 C4,C5,F2 53 240% -26% 15% N/A
72 C4,F1,F1 51 212% -100% N/A N/A
73 C4,F1,F2 49 192% -98% N/A N/A
74 C4,F2,F2 45 179% -88% N/A N/A
75 C5,C5,C5 16 81% 70% 90% 61%
76 C5,C5,F1 72 460% -71% -44% N/A
77 C5,C5,F2 43 333% -29% -9% N/A
78 C5,F1,F1 17 134% -100% N/A N/A
79 C5,F1,F2 18 153% -98% N/A N/A
80 C5,F2,F2 18 155% -96% N/A N/A
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Table 14: System Revenue and Accepted Loads for Three-Carrier Alliances (Distribution
D2)
Instance Carriers Chg. in System Chg. in Loads
Class (A, B, C) Revenue Accepted
Actual % A B C
1 C1,C1,C1 558 171% 139% 149% 147%
2 C1,C1,C2 420 139% 111% 100% 342%
3 C1,C1,C3 340 111% 82% 81% 416%
4 C1,C1,C4 316 101% 79% 84% 5400%
5 C1,C1,C5 297 96% 75% 84% 4033%
6 C1,C1,F1 508 160% 51% 51% N/A
7 C1,C1,F2 332 99% 70% 62% N/A
8 C1,C2,C2 315 133% 61% 291% 246%
9 C1,C2,C3 225 100% 38% 196% 327%
10 C1,C2,C4 197 77% 34% 190% 1030%
11 C1,C2,C5 178 70% 31% 214% 1333%
12 C1,C2,F1 387 143% 5% 115% N/A
13 C1,C2,F2 217 83% 24% 173% N/A
14 C1,C3,C3 164 82% 19% 285% 231%
15 C1,C3,C4 118 50% 15% 213% 889%
16 C1,C3,C5 100 42% 11% 180% 5850%
17 C1,C3,F1 277 115% -14% 187% N/A
18 C1,C3,F2 143 59% 5% 165% N/A
19 C1,C4,C4 84 32% 11% 918% 707%
20 C1,C4,C5 57 21% 8% 746% 1110%
21 C1,C4,F1 251 88% -18% 388% N/A
22 C1,C4,F2 94 34% -3% 800% N/A
23 C1,C5,C5 45 16% 2% 1786% 1036%
24 C1,C5,F1 227 81% -23% 790% N/A
25 C1,C5,F2 76 26% -5% 762% N/A
26 C1,F1,F1 347 118% -40% N/A N/A
27 C1,F1,F2 239 79% -31% N/A N/A
28 C1,F2,F2 110 36% -13% N/A N/A
29 C2,C2,C2 227 153% 142% 136% 144%
30 C2,C2,C3 168 141% 95% 91% 177%
31 C2,C2,C4 141 105% 82% 82% 892%
32 C2,C2,C5 131 107% 87% 77% 1036%
33 C2,C2,F1 314 227% 13% 30% N/A
34 C2,C2,F2 177 127% 60% 51% N/A
35 C2,C3,C3 121 126% 52% 148% 156%
36 C2,C3,C4 91 95% 26% 113% 691%
37 C2,C3,C5 82 84% 26% 117% 883%
38 C2,C3,F1 222 219% -23% 27% N/A
39 C2,C3,F2 116 114% 10% 79% N/A
40 C2,C4,C4 71 69% 28% 581% 489%
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
Instance Carriers Chg. in System Chg. in Loads
Class (A, B, C) Revenue Accepted
Actual % A B C
41 C2,C4,C5 54 51% 17% 220% 443%
42 C2,C4,F1 218 201% -39% 238% N/A
43 C2,C4,F2 100 92% 2% 381% N/A
44 C2,C5,C5 37 35% 8% 656% 467%
45 C2,C5,F1 185 163% -39% 207% N/A
46 C2,C5,F2 74 69% -12% 307% N/A
47 C2,F1,F1 220 170% -66% N/A N/A
48 C2,F1,F2 179 139% -54% N/A N/A
49 C2,F2,F2 98 80% -22% N/A N/A
50 C3,C3,C3 104 143% 143% 124% 128%
51 C3,C3,C4 68 103% 75% 79% 195%
52 C3,C3,C5 67 107% 79% 87% 1600%
53 C3,C3,F1 150 225% -2% 9% N/A
54 C3,C3,F2 90 130% 35% 39% N/A
55 C3,C4,C4 46 84% 34% 256% 188%
56 C3,C4,C5 39 77% 29% 281% 395%
57 C3,C4,F1 133 241% -40% -8% N/A
58 C3,C4,F2 63 114% -14% 144% N/A
59 C3,C5,C5 35 73% 27% 304% 613%
60 C3,C5,F1 105 193% -43% 136% N/A
61 C3,C5,F2 56 108% -20% 228% N/A
62 C3,F1,F1 110 190% -79% N/A N/A
63 C3,F1,F2 88 151% -67% N/A N/A
64 C3,F2,F2 58 98% -43% N/A N/A
65 C4,C4,C4 50 208% 164% 214% 155%
66 C4,C4,C5 34 150% 75% 117% 216%
67 C4,C4,F1 124 406% -49% -62% N/A
68 C4,C4,F2 72 306% 32% 8% N/A
69 C4,C5,C5 25 142% 52% 211% 135%
70 C4,C5,F1 97 448% -65% -59% N/A
71 C4,C5,F2 54 257% -25% 18% N/A
72 C4,F1,F1 49 188% -100% N/A N/A
73 C4,F1,F2 50 205% -100% N/A N/A
74 C4,F2,F2 46 194% -89% N/A N/A
75 C5,C5,C5 22 162% 122% 149% 211%
76 C5,C5,F1 71 473% -62% -62% N/A
77 C5,C5,F2 42 318% -20% -17% N/A
78 C5,F1,F1 18 151% -100% N/A N/A
79 C5,F1,F2 17 131% -99% N/A N/A
80 C5,F2,F2 17 139% -96% N/A N/A
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3.3 Analysis of the Impact of Network Integration and Compatibility
on Alliance Success
In this second set of experiments we explore how the level of network integration among
alliance members impacts the success of the alliance. The goal of one experiment is to gain
an understanding of how increasing connectivity between hubs of partnering carriers impacts
alliance revenue and accepted loads. In the second experiment the impact of common service
points is explored. For example, suppose carrier i is considering two potential partners. One
potential partner serves 10% of the same destinations as carrier i, while the other potential
carrier has 20% of destinations in common with carrier i. Thus an alliance with the first
partner will serve a more diverse set of locations than an alliance with the second partner,
but the alliance with the second partner will have more transfer points between the networks
of each carrier. Which partner will form a better alliance with carrier i?
Recall that each carrier operates a pure hub-and-spoke network, and that a hub-to-
hub route exists between every pair of hubs operated by carrier i. Furthermore, all loads
associated with carrier i originate at one of the hubs operated by carrier i; the destinations
are randomly generated from the set of spoke destinations according to distribution D1 or
D2, as defined in Section 3.1.
3.3.1 Hub-Hub Connectivity
To investigate the impact of hub-to-hub connectivity, an alliance comprised of two carriers
of class C1 is considered. The number of hub-to-hub connections is increased from 0 to 9; as
each carrier operates 3 hubs, 9 is the maximum number of connections. The case in which 0
hubs are connected is equivalent to the case in which each carrier is working independently.
Let HA1 ,H
A
2 , and H
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B
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3 ). (Changing the order of hub-hub connections does not significantly impact the
results.)
For each instance class, where an instance class is defined by the number of hub-to-hub
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connections, 30 random instances were generated and solved. The results are summarized
in Figure 8; for each instance class, the percent improvement in system revenue and number
of loads accepted (over the total amount of revenue earned and loads accepted when each
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(b) Impact on Accepted Loads
Figure 8: Impact of Hub-Hub Connectivity on {C1,C1} Alliance
As depicted in these graphs, the benefit associated with hub integration increases
steadily with the number of interconnected hubs. Not surprisingly, the impact is much
more pronounced when carriers must rely on their partner to deliver a high proportion of
their associated loads, as is the case in demand distribution D2. The results of this experi-
ment imply that regardless of the distribution of demand, an alliance will be more successful
as access between the hubs of partnering carriers is increased.
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3.3.2 Complementarity of Markets
In this experiment we investigate how the number of common service points impacts the
overall success of the alliance, again in terms of system revenue and loads accepted. In
order to allow for loads to be routed from the network of carrier i to carrier j, the set of
legs for this experiment is expanded to include legs oriented from spoke-to-hub as well as
legs oriented from hub-to-spoke. More specifically, for each pair of hubs h1, h2 for which
a hub-to-hub route exists, two hub-to-hub legs are generated; one leg originates at time 0
and arrives at time 1, while the second leg originates at time 3 and arrives at time 4. For
each (hub, spoke) pair, two hub-to-spoke legs are generated; one leg originates at time 1
and arrives at time 2, while the second leg originates at time 4 and arrives at time 5. Also
for each (hub, spoke) pair, one spoke-to-hub leg is generated; this leg originates at time 2
and arrives at time 3. Ultimately, this allows a load to flow along a path comprised of the
following legs: (h1, h2), (h2, s1), (s1, h3), (h3, s2), where h1 and h2 are operated by carrier A,
s2 is a destination in common between both carriers, and h3 and s2 are operated by carrier
B.
For this experiment, an instance class is defined by the number of spoke destinations in
common between two carriers. For all pairs of carriers, the number of common markets was
increased from 0 to the maximum number of common markets possible, which is the number
of spoke legs operated by the carrier with the smaller network. The results are summarized
in Figures 9-13; for a given carrier i, the graphs show the impact of increasing the number of
common service points from 0% to 100% when carrier i partners with each of the five classes
of carriers. Note that the peak changes as the partner for a given carrier varies–both the
optimal percent of market overlap as well as the resulting percent improvement in alliance
revenue change with the composition of the alliance. It can be seen in Figure 9 that the
impact of common markets is very similar for alliance revenue and accepted loads; this is in
fact the case for every carrier. Consequently, only alliance revenue results are summarized


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note that these results are based on evaluating the benefit experienced by the alliance
as a whole, judged by the percent increase over the total revenue that can be earned when
the alliance partners operate independently. We use this measure in favor of measuring
the actual increase in alliance revenue because it offers better perspective on the relative
gain; a gain that would be considered small for one alliance may be significant for another.
Consequently, a partner for which the actual alliance benefit is very high may be consid-
ered less attractive than a partner for which the actual alliance benefit is less, but the
percent benefit experienced by the alliance is high. This is reasonable, however, given the
circumstances under which it occurs. For example, an alliance comprised of a large carrier
and a small carrier would experience greater alliance benefit than an alliance comprised of
two small carriers. The alliance comprised of two small carriers, however, will experience
a higher percent benefit. From the perspective of the small carrier, arguing that another
small carrier makes a more attractive partner is not unreasonable, as it is likely that a large
alliance partner would command a high proportion of alliance benefit.
Evaluating the impact of increasing the percentage of common markets between alliance
partners leads to the following insights pertaining to the optimal level of market overlap,
as well characteristics of an attractive alliance partner:
• The results suggest that it is not beneficial for carriers to have more than 60% of
their markets in common. This is because increasing the number of common markets
essentially increases access to another carrier’s network, and as partners’ networks
more closely resemble each other, the impact of forming an alliance decreases. Con-
sequently, increasing access between the networks is less valuable.
• When a carrier with a large or medium-size network (C1, C2, or C3) collaborates
with another carrier with a large or medium-size network, the results suggest that the
optimal level of market overlap is approximately 20%. When a carrier with a large
or medium-size network collaborates with a carrier with a small network (C4 or C5),
the maximum alliance benefit occurs at 40% or 60% market overlap. Because overlap
is measured as the percentage of destinations that the smaller carrier has in common
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with the larger carrier, it is reasonable that the optimal overlap percentage is higher
when partnering with smaller carriers.
• For a carrier with a small network size, the maximum percentage alliance benefit
occurs at 20% market overlap when collaborating with a carrier with similar network
size and fleet capacity, but at 40% or 60% when collaborating with other types of
carriers.
• Under demand distribution D1, carriers of type C4 are more attractive partners than
carriers of type C3, demonstrating once again that high fleet capacity is a very desir-
able characteristic in a potential alliance partner.
• Under distribution D2, the most attractive partner for a carrier is always a carrier
of similar network size and fleet capacity, yielding an percentage increase in alliance
benefit between 40% and 60% for the optimal market overlap of 20%. For other
potential partners, the percent alliance benefit decreases with network size and fleet
capacity, and the optimal market overlap can vary between 20% and 60%.
The results of this set of experiments demonstrate that for a given carrier, an ideal
alliance partner is typically a carrier of similar network size and fleet capacity who serves
approximately 20% of the same destinations. The results also imply that for other alliance
partners, alliance results can vary greatly according to market overlap, as well as demand,
network size, and fleet capacity.
3.4 Analysis of a Real Alliance
In this section a real-world alliance is analyzed; the goal is to evaluate the decisions to
both form and grow the alliance. The subject of the analysis is the WOW cargo alliance,
which was selected because at the time of this study it is the only cargo alliance for which
the set of participating carriers is not a subset of a passenger alliance. This alliance was
initially formed in 2002 by Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, and Singapore Airlines, who
are currently members of the Star Alliance. Japan Airlines, who is not a member of the
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Star Alliance, was later added. After describing how the alliance network was constructed
for the experiment, revenue and load acceptance results are presented and discussed.
3.4.1 Data Generation
In order to construct the alliance network, the actual networks operated by the individual
members of the alliance were duplicated, subject to the following approximations:
• With the exception of flights between major cities, domestic flights are ignored. For
Scandinavian Airlines, intra-Baltic flights (except between major cities) are also ig-
nored. This approximation simplifies the alliance network without significantly com-
promising the integrity of the study; it is assumed that the formation of an interna-
tional cargo alliance will not significantly impact strictly domestic (or intra-Baltic)
cargo service.
• Networks are approximated as pure hub-and-spoke networks, with only major hubs
being considered. Information about the hubs for each carrier is contained in Table 15.
While Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, and Scandinavian Airlines each have cities that are
the base for around 5-10 flights, the great majority of the destinations served by these
“minor” hubs are also served by at least one of the carriers’ major hubs. Ignoring
minor hubs therefore has minimal impact on the overall study. Furthermore, a few
cities are reachable only via a stopover, rather than directly from a hub. For the
purposed of this study, these cities (fewer than 15) are included as destinations directly
accessible from a hub.
• In general, subsidiary airlines are not included in the study. The exception is Lufthansa;
flights operated by both Lufthansa and Lufthansa Regional are considered. Lufthansa
Regional operations are considered because they comprise a significant proportion
of the overall operations of Lufthanasa. In contrast, the operations of subsidiaries
of Japan Airlines (Japan Transocean Air, JAL Express, Japan Air Commuter, J-
Air, Hokkaido Air System, JALWays), Singapore Airlines (Silk Air, Tiger Airways),
and Scandinavian Airlines (Spanair, Blue1, Air Baltic, Widerøe), as well as other
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Table 15: Network Information for Approximated WOW Alliance
Carrier Hubs
# of Dest. Total # of (#,%)* of
Served from Dest. Destinations in Common
Each Hub Served JAL LH SAS SIA
JAL Tokyo 41 41 – 23, 56% 22, 54% 25, 61%Osaka 17
LH Frankfurt 139 160 23, 56% – 39, 62% 38, 63%Munich 79
SAS Copenhagen 41 63 11, 27% 39, 62% – 16, 27%Stockholm 17
SIA Singapore 60 60 25, 61% 38, 63% 16, 27% –
* percentage is calculated based on smallest number of destinations, then rounded
Lufthansa subsidiaries (Eurowings, Lufthansa City Line, Air Dolomiti, Augsburg Air-
ways, Contact Air) are relatively insignificant compared to the operations of the parent
carriers.
Information regarding hubs, the number of destinations served by each carrier, and the
number of destinations in common among the carriers is contained in Table 15. More
detailed information regarding the approximated networks can be found in Appendix A.
The following abbreviations are used in Table 15, Appendix A, and the remainder of this
section: “JAL” for Japan Airlines, “LH” for Lufthansa, “SAS” for Scandinavian Airlines,
and “SIA” for Singapore Airlines.
The legs are generated according to the network operated by each carrier, with the
origin and destination times being set in a similar manner as in the experiment investigating
complementarity of markets (Section 3.3.2). That is, the (origin, destination) time of hub-
to-spoke legs is (1,2) and (4,5), the (origin, destination) time of spoke-to-hub legs is (2,3),
and the (origin, destination) time of hub-to-hub legs is (0,1) and (3,4). This allows cargo to
use the networks of at most two carriers; given that each pair of carriers has at least 27%
of destinations in common, it is feasible for cargo to travel between any pair of destinations
served by the alliance. Note that generating legs in this manner implies that every city
serviced by a carrier is serviced with the same frequency.
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In this experiment the hubs operated by a single carrier are connected, but hub HA,
operated by carrier A, and hub HB, operated by carrier B, are connected only if a route
exists between HA and HB in the network operated by carrier A or carrier B. Finally, the
capacity on each leg is scaled to 5. Each of the four carriers studied has a fleet containing
planes with varying capacities. However, all fleets contain a significant number of high-
capacity planes, and it is assumed that the higher capacity planes are used on international
routes. Therefore, the assigned value reflects the capacity used for carriers with large fleet
capacities in Section 3.1.
For this experiment, the loads are generated as described in Section 3.1. The relative
size for each carrier, determined according to the number of spoke legs operated by each
carrier, is as follows: JAL = 1, LH = 3.5, SAS = 1.5, SIA = 1.
3.4.2 Results and Analysis
We constructed the original three-carrier WOW alliance consisting of LH, SAS, and SIA,
as well as the current four-carrier WOW alliance with JAL also included. In addition
to evaluating the benefit that the carriers experience by participating in the alliance as
compared to working independently, the decision to include JAL in the alliance can also be
evaluated. Information pertaining to revenue and load acceptance for each carrier’s local
(independent) solution is contained in Table 16, along with load acceptance results for the
three and four-carrier alliances. The results are the rounded average from 30 instances
generated as described in the previous section. Table 17 contains the rounded, averaged
results comparing the total revenue for the local solutions and the three and four-carrier
alliance solutions.
Based on the alliance revenue and load results, we make the following observations:
• The results for the 3-carrier alliance are as expected when the results of Section 3.2.2
are considered; the 3-carrier alliance of LH, SAS, and SIA, with relative sizes of (3.5,
1.5, 1) is best compared to a {C2,C4,C4} alliance. A {C2,C4,C4} alliance experiences
an increase in alliance revenue of 29% over the sum of independent carrier solutions
under demand distribution D1, while the increase in revenue is 69% under D2. The
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Table 16: Revenue and Load Acceptance Results for Local and Alliance Optimal Solutions
(a) Demand Distribution D1
Carrier





Accepted v. local v. 3-carrier
JAL 126.1 20.4 N/A 140.1% N/A
LH 917.0 152.1 22.4% 25.9% 2.9%
SAS 245.7 39.8 94.6% 99.7% 2.6%
SIA 264.5 43.7 26.7% 29.1% 1.9%
(b) Demand Distribution D2
Carrier





Accepted v. local v. 3-carrier
JAL 105.9 17.1 N/A 188.3% N/A
LH 877.0 143.4 29.0% 30.2% 0.9%
SAS 200.9 32.1 137.6% 143.0% 2.3%
SIA 201.9 34.0 55.5% 61.8% 4.0%
Table 17: Change in Revenue for Alliance Before and After JAL
# of Carriers Distribution D1 Distribution D2
in Change v. Change v. Change v. Change v.
Alliance Sum of Local 3-Carrier Sum of Local 3-Carrier
3-Carrier alliance 39.2% – 53.6% –
4-Carrier alliance 52.1% 19.0% 68.5% 18.7%
3-carrier WOW alliance, meanwhile, experiences a 39% benefit under distribution D1
and a 53.6% benefit under D2. However, as the relative sizes of carriers become closer,
the difference between D1 and D2 becomes less pronounced. Consequently, we expect,
and do in fact observe, that the gap in benefit between the distributions narrows as
well.
• As we would expect based on the results in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the number of
loads accepted is impacted by the distribution of demand more significantly for the
smaller carriers in the alliance. This is not surprising, because the distribution of
loads changes more for a small carrier than for a large carrier. This result implies
that a small carrier needs to exercise more caution in joining a potential alliance than
does a larger carrier, who is impacted less by variation in demand distribution and
can therefore be more confident that the expected benefit will be realized.
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• Two carriers, JAL and SAS, benefit significantly more from collaborating than do
LH and SIA. The reason is different for each carrier, however. SAS has the lowest
amount of overlap with the networks of partnering carriers, and therefore experiences
significant benefit from gaining access to the other markets. This result makes sense
intuitively, as well as in light of the results of Section 3.3.2; note that the network
overlap between SAS and JAL, as well as between SAS and SIA, is 27%. JAL, on
the other hand, has between 50% and 60% of markets in common with other carriers.
However, JAL also serves the fewest number of destinations of any carrier in the
alliance, and therefore stands to gain the most (percentage-wise, at least) from access
to other markets.
• Based on the percentage increase in accepted loads, LH, SAS, and SIA benefit only
marginally from JAL joining the alliance. JAL, on the other hand, experiences a
large increase in the number of accepted loads by joining the alliance. This disparity
suggests that careful distribution of alliance benefit is necessary to ensure that LH,
SAS, and SIA experience measurable gain from the growth of the alliance.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have explored different types of alliances, and drawn conclusions per-
taining to the potential for success as factors such as demand distribution, network size,
fleet capacity, hub integration, and market overlap vary. Implementing the management
mechanism developed in Chapter 2 confirms that the mechanism yields allocations within
the core of the carrier alliance game when the Strict Control and Stabilized Limited Control
behavioral models are employed. However, analysis of allocations obtained for two-carrier
alliances demonstrated that refinement was necessary to avoid arbitrary apportionment of
alliance benefit.
Several interesting insights were obtained regarding the relationship between demand
distribution, network size and fleet capacity. First, the distribution of demand has a large
impact on the potential for alliance success. When a high proportion of loads require the
use of a partner’s network, the benefit associated with collaborating is more substantial,
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which is to be expected. Alliances must be evaluated more carefully in the case where
a greater proportion of demand can be served by a single carrier; in these cases, it may
not even be beneficial to grow the alliance. Second, variation in distribution of demand
impacts the expected increase in accepted loads for small carriers much more than for
large carriers, implying that larger carriers can be more confident regarding the expected
benefit (in terms of an increase in accepted loads) associated with collaborating. Third,
depending on the distribution of demand, fleet capacity can be a more important factor
in determining the benefit associated with collaborating than network size, implying that
partners–or subsidiaries–with high fleet capacity may be more valuable than those with
smaller fleet capacity but a larger number of markets served.
Regarding the compatibility of member networks, it was demonstrated that increasing
hub-to-hub connectivity increases the benefit associated with collaborating in a surprisingly
linear fashion. This suggests that carriers in an alliance should take steps to increase access
to one another’s hubs in order to attain maximum alliance benefit. In a separate study, it
was determined that in a majority of cases, ideal partners are those who (1) have similar
network size and fleet capacity, and (2) serve 20% of the same destinations.
Analysis of the WOW cargo alliance confirmed that JAL, LH, SAS, and SIA are in-
deed compatible, experiencing a significant increase in alliance revenue under both demand
distributions studied. The addition of JAL to the original alliance of LH, SAS, and SIA in-
creased total alliance revenue around 20%, although the original three carriers experienced




In Chapter 2, allocations were examined for their ability to motivate carriers to participate
in an alliance. From a game theoretic point of view, any core allocation is desirable, since
every subset of participants receives at least as much revenue as it would earn by forming
a separate and independent alliance. By examining the allocation results in Table 12 of
Section 3.2.1, however, it becomes evident that not all core solutions are equally desirable.
Consider the instance class comprised of carriers C1 (large network size and large fleet
capacity) and C5 (small network size and small fleet capacity). The mechanism, when
implemented as developed in Chapter 2 and using demand distribution D2, dictates the
allocation results contained in Table 18. For each carrier and each behavioral model, the
table shows the amount of alliance benefit allocated to each carrier.
Table 18: Allocation Results for {C1,C5} Alliance
Behavioral Model C1 Benefit C5 Benefit
Strict Control 8.5 15.6
Limited Control 11.9 12.2
Stabilized Limited Control 19.7 4.3
Carrier C1 is contributing 92.3% of alliance loads and capacity. Yet, under the Strict
Control model, C1 is only receiving 35.3% of the total benefit of 24.1 units of revenue gained
by the alliance. Under the Limited Control model C1 receives 49.4% of the total benefit, and
under the Stabilized Limited Control model C1 receives 81.7% of the total benefit. Because
each carrier is receiving non-negative benefit by collaborating, each of these allocations is
a core allocation. That the Limited Control model apportions benefit more evenly, or that
the Stabilized Limited Control model apportions more benefit to carrier C1, is arbitrary, as
any of the above allocations is feasible using any of the behavioral models. (It was shown
in Chapter 2 that any solution feasible for the Strict Control model is also feasible for the
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Limited Control. Furthermore, because the Stabilized Control model eliminates only non-
core allocations from being obtained, any core allocation feasible under the Limited Control
model is also feasible under the Stabilized Limited Control model.)
In this chapter we explore how the mechanism developed in Chapter 2 can be adapted to
incorporate various notions of fairness. After a brief discussion of literature related to fair-
ness in allocation, we describe a methodology that modifies an inverse problem (InvStrict,
InvLC, or InvSLC) to favor an allocation that achieves fairness according to some prede-
termined measure. Several basic fairness measures are then proposed, and their performance
analyzed for the alliances studied in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3.
4.1 Related Literature
The problem of fairness in allocation has been most widely studied in classic economic
applications dealing with the allocation of costs or benefits of publicly owned goods or ser-
vices. [22] offers a detailed discussion on equity principles that are often applied in theory,
but points out that in many applications these principals lead to contradictory or otherwise
unsatisfactory solutions. The conflict of selecting from among allocation mechanisms that
satisfy some, but not all, desirable properties is also addressed in [34]. In this work several
allocation methods are discussed, but two emerge as being particularly suitable when con-
sidering principles of equity. The Shapley value is shown to be monotonic, which is desirable
because allocation schemes exhibiting this property ensure that as a player’s contribution
to a coalition changes, his allocation will change accordingly. This property is especially im-
portant in situations where allocations are periodically reassessed as relevant data changes,
such as in the carrier alliance game. However, [34] also demonstrates that monotonicity is
contradictory with staying in the core of a game, implying that the Shapley value is not in
general a core allocation. An alternative allocation method, which is guaranteed to produce
an allocation in the core (when the core is nonempty), is the nucleolus. The Shapley and
nucleolus allocations will be further discussed in Section 4.3.
Unfortunately there is a disconnect between the theory and practice of fairness in allo-
cation. Allocation schemes with desirable theoretical properties are often computationally
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or conceptually difficult to implement in practice. Meanwhile, allocation schemes that are
commonly used in practice do not often achieve the goals for which they were designed. For
example, distribution of revenue based on the relative distance travelled on each carrier’s
network is a scheme often used among code-sharing partners in the passenger airline indus-
try. It can be easily shown however (see [8], for example), that this scheme leads to very
inequitable allocations. [25] addresses both theoretical and practical considerations of cost
allocation in the context of transportation procurement networks. In this work, practical
limitations of mechanisms that perform well in theory are discussed, and mechanisms are
developed that exhibit properties that are desirable in the specific setting addressed. Once
again it is shown that no mechanism can satisfy all properties at once.
Outside the realm of traditional cooperative game theory, fairness in assignment of
costs or benefits is a relevant consideration in the design of auctions. In classic auction
literature, an auction mechanism is designed to maximize the seller’s expected revenues.
However, auctions are increasingly being used in the public sector, where it is inappropriate
to maximize the revenue earned by the seller, or conversely, the prices paid by the bidders.
One possibility to increase fairness in the public setting is to design an auction such that
outcomes are evaluated with respect to submitted bids, rather than for their ability to simply
maximize the seller’s revenue. This idea is explored in [6]. [11] proposes a mechanism in
which the total payments made by bidders are minimized. The mechanism yields outcomes
which are in the core, and can be implemented for auctions dealing with a large number of
items.
4.2 Methodology
Before discussing specific fairness measures and how target allocations are computed ac-
cording to those measures, we introduce notation and discuss the general methodology for
adapting the mechanism developed in Chapter 2. Let x denote some target allocation, and
zi = xi − xi be the distance of carrier i′s actual allocation xi from the target allocation for
carrier i. zi > 0 indicates that carrier i has been allocated an amount that is strictly greater
than targeted allocation amount for him; zi < 0 indicates that carrier i’s actual allocation
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falls short of the target allocation amount. Let yS denote the benefit subset S ∈ N will
experience if the target allocation x is attained: yS =
∑
i∈S
(xi − v(i)). Similarly, yS is the
actual benefit experienced by subset S: yS =
∑
i∈S
(xi − v(i)). Note that since all mechanism






xi, implying that yN = yN .
In order to adapt the mechanism to favor a particular target allocation x (where x is





















)−xi = zi. (87)
The first three terms of (87) constitute carrier i’s actual allocation xi. By solving the new
constraint set using the objective function min
∑
i(z
i)2, a set of capacity exchange prices will
be found that defines an allocation where, overall, carriers are as close as possible to their
target allocation. This approach can be easily modified to accommodate alliance needs. For
example, if it is more important for some carriers rather than others to achieve their target
allocation, which may be the case when some carriers have more bargaining power than
others, weights may be incorporated to reflect the relative importance of carriers. In this
case one might use the objective function min
∑
i w
i|zi|, where ∑i wi = 1 and wi represents
the weight assigned to carrier i.
4.3 Proposed Fairness Rules
In this section, several notions of fairness are proposed. In most cases, the proposed measure
is used to allocate the alliance benefit v(N) − ∑i v(i) among the alliance members. The
final notion of fairness discussed, however, enforces a minimum service level for each carrier,
where service level is defined as the number of loads accepted. This measure can therefore
be used alone or in combination with one of the other measures discussed.
Clearly, the appropriateness of a measure of fairness is dependent on the characteristics
of the alliance partners and the underlying network. More sophisticated measures may be
defined as necessary, but may require the incorporation of additional data into the model.
Of critical importance is understanding the effect that a proposed measure will have on
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actual allocations; recall for example that the fare proration scheme described in Section
4.1 can lead to allocations that are unstable.
4.3.1 Equal Benefits
A simple definition of fairness might be the following: every carrier in the alliance should
receive equal benefit from collaborating. While clearly this would not always be perceived
as fair by all participating carriers, the simple equal benefits rule is interesting to explore
as a base case. In order to achieve fairness according to the equal benefits rule, let xi =
v(i) + 1|N |y
N . Applying the equal benefits rule to the example in the introduction to this
chapter would allocate half of the 24.1 units of alliance benefit to each carrier. Since the
amount of revenue carriers C1 and C5 can earn by operating independently are 289.6 and
1.5, respectively, the resulting allocations would be as follows: xA = 301.65, xB = 13.55. In
general, the equal benefits rule distributes the total alliance benefit as equally as possible
among all alliance members.
The equal benefits rule is similar in concept to the nucleolus, which maximizes the value
of the minimum benefit yS over all subsets S ∈ N . Intuitively, the nucleolus can be thought
of as the “center” of the core. A practical difficulty with the nucleolus is that it cannot
in general be efficiently computed. In contrast, the equal benefits allocation can be easily
computed and, like all other measures discussed in this section, can be implemented with
the addition of |N | constraints.
4.3.2 Value of Contribution: Capacity Value and Load Value
An alternative way to define fairness is in terms of the value each individual member con-
tributes to the alliance. If value was measured only by capacity, then the more valuable
the capacity an individual member contributes to the alliance, the more benefit he should
receive from participating. This measure might be appropriate when capacity is a scare
resource, for example, if airport capacities limit airlines from obtaining landing rights at
new locations. Let R(o,d,i) = r(o,d,i)f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) , or the actual amount of revenue earned from
load (o, d, i) in the centralized solution f∗. Let n(o,d,i) =
∑
(e∈E:ke<∞)
f∗(o,d,i), or the total
amount of capacity (over all flights) used by load (o, d, i) in f∗. Then we can allocate the
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revenue R(o,d,i) over all legs used to deliver load (o, d, i) such that each leg is allocated an
amount of revenue proportional to the contribution of that leg’s capacity to n(o,d,i). That




. If exactly one
path is used to deliver a load, then the load’s revenue will be equally allocated among every


















The amount of alliance benefit allocated to carrier i is determined by carrier i’s pro-




N . Hence the target allocation for carrier i is





If instead value was measured only by loads, then the more valuable the loads an indi-
vidual carrier brings to the alliance, the more benefit he receives. This measure would be
appropriate when loads are a scarce resource, for example, in situations where local carri-
ers retain the majority of local business. To implement this measure, we allocate carrier
i an amount of benefit according to the proportional value of his loads. The proportional







, and the target allocation for carrier i
is therefore xi = v(i) + P iyN . Note that in this measure, a carrier is rewarded for all the
loads he brings to the alliance; the carrier is not penalized for an alliance decision to reject
a load.
For alliances in which some carriers have more local business but do not operate flights
to all desired locations, while other carriers operate in-demand flights but do not attract
many loads, it makes sense to value both capacity and loads. To this we can assign weights
wc and w` to the value of capacity and loads, respectively, where wc + w` = 1. Let xc be
the target allocation vector computed according to the capacity value rule described above,
while x` is the target allocation vector computed according to the load value rule. Then
the target allocation for carrier i under a fairness measure that values both capacity and
loads is xi = wcxic + w`x
i
`.
Computing a target allocation based on the value a carrier brings to an alliance is
similar in concept to the Shapley value, since the Shapley value for carrier i is the average
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marginal contribution of carrier i to each subset of the alliance. However, choosing to define
an allocation based on the value of a carrier has two distinct advantages: in addition to
the conceptual appeal of defining an allocation based on the setting in which it is applied,
the capacity value and load value measures are easy to compute. (Like the nucleolus, the
Shapley value in general cannot be efficiently computed.)
4.3.3 Minimum Service Level
The computational experiments performed in Chapter 3 do not indicate that carriers in
general suffer a decline in the number of loads accepted, the notable exception being alliances
in which one or more partners is a freight forwarder. Even for alliances not containing freight
forwarders, however, there is value in exploring the notion of enforcing minimum service
levels.
A minimum service level may be defined in two different ways:
(1) a carrier i must deliver at least as many loads as he could deliver by working inde-
pendently.
(2) every load delivered in carrier i’s independent solution must also be delivered in the
alliance solution.










(d,o,i) ∀i ∈ N , where f ′ is the optimal solution to carrier i’s independent problem.
The second definition is implemented by instead adding constraints f∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) ≥ f
′(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈
L. The latter definition is thus more constraining than the former, but has the appeal of
protecting carrier i’s existing customers, ensuring that they will not suffer when carrier i
joins an alliance.
Because the aggregation of all independent solutions must be feasible from the alliance
perspective, enforcing a minimum service level in either of the two ways proposed above does
not impact the feasibility of C. The functionality of the mechanism itself is not impacted by
changing the alliance optimal solution, since the mechanism is designed to ensure that some
alliance solution f∗ is attained. As a result, a minimum service level can be implemented
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(and in fact achieved) in conjunction with one of the revenue allocation methods discussed
in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
4.4 Computational Analysis of Fairness Measures
In this section we analyze the performance of the equal benefits, capacity value, and load
value fairness measures. The goal is to gain a general understanding of (1) how both
the targeted and realized allocations change with each measure of fairness, (2) how the
appropriateness of the measures changes with the composition of the alliance, and (3) how
the choice of behavioral model impacts the success of achieving the targeted allocation. To
achieve the first goal, results are presented for two-carrier alliances and the WOW alliance
describing in detail the target allocation for each carrier under each rule. (The target
allocation is not impacted by the choice of behavioral model). The second and third goals
are accomplished by analyzing, for each measure and each model, how close the allocations
achieved by the mechanism are to the target allocations.
4.4.1 Two-Carrier Alliance Fairness Results
For each measure of fairness, the target allocation according to that measure, as well as the
percent of alliance benefit each carrier will receive if the target allocation is met, are shown
in Tables 19 and 20; Table 19 contains the target allocations for instances generated using
demand distribution D1, while Table 20 contains the allocations for instances generated
using distribution D2. Recall that xi denotes the target allocation for carrier i, and yi
denotes the benefit carrier i will receive if he is allocated xi. The target benefit under the
equal benefits rule is always 50%, and is therefore omitted from the tables.
The target allocations under the capacity value and load value fairness measures behave
as we would expect as the network size and fleet capacity of the carriers comprising an
alliance change. For example, when two carriers with similar network size and fleet capacity
collaborate, the target benefit allocated to each carrier is roughly 50%. When dissimilar
carriers collaborate, the larger carrier (in terms of network size or fleet capacity) is targeted
to receive more benefit under both measures. We also observe that the distribution of
demand has little impact on the percent benefit each carrier will experience if the target
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allocation is achieved. This is not surprising since changing the distribution of demand does






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 14-16 summarize the performance of each fairness rule. For each instance and
each carrier, the percentage distance between the actual allocation xi and the target alloca-
tion xi was computed. The graphs depict how many times an allocation missed the target
by the given range; the number of total trials is 1500 for each behavioral model because
25 instance classes were tested (all two-carrier alliance combinations), with 30 instances


























































































(b) Equal Benefits (D2)
Figure 14: Performance of Equal Benefits Rule for Two Carrier Alliances
In general, the Limited Control and Stabilized Limited Control models are very effective
at achieving the target allocation. As expected based on the analysis conducted in Chapter
2, the smaller feasible region of the Strict Control model compromises the performance of



























































































(b) Capacity Value (D2)



























































































(b) Load Value (D2)




Figure 17: Alliance Network for Fairness Example




(o, d, A1) 2 1
(o, d, A2) 1 1
depending on the distribution of demand. A theoretical analysis of the ability of the mech-
anism to achieve a target allocation computed according to the Equal Benefits rule using
the Strict Control model is conducted for a simple example in Appendix B.
The computational results suggest that the neither the composition of the alliance nor
the distribution of demand has significant impact on the performance of the Limited Control
and Stabilized Limited Control models, and they have only minor impact on the performance
of the Strict Control model. For this reason, we reserve more in depth analysis for three-
carrier alliances. However, it is appropriate to note that in this experiment, every equal
benefits target allocation was achieved exactly when the Limited Control and Stabilized
Limited Control models were implemented. This is not in general always true; consider
the simple example depicted in Figure 17 and Table 21. For this example the notation
is modified to differentiate between two loads with the same origin and destination, both
associated with carrier A.
Leg (o, d) is operated by carrier B and has a capacity of two units. The centralized
optimal solution is to deliver both (o, d, A1) and (o, d, A2), and the total alliance benefit is
3. Given that neither carrier can earn any revenue by working alone, a target allocation
computed according to the equal benefits rule will allocate 1.5 units of revenue to each
carrier. However, the maximum feasible value for c(o,d) is 1, since for any c(o,d) > 1 carrier
A will not deliver (o, d,A2). The maximum allocation for carrier B is therefore 2, and the
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equal benefits target cannot be satisfied.
4.4.2 Three-Carrier Fairness Results
The performance of the equal benefits fairness measure for three carrier alliances is sum-
marized for all instances in Figure 18. Similarly to the results for two-carrier alliances, we
observe that the behavior of each measure and model combination changes very little with
the distribution of demand. For this reason, only the results for distribution D1 are pre-
sented in the remainder of the section. Figures 19(a) and 19(b) summarize the performance
of the Capacity Value and Load Value fairness measures, respectively, over all three-carrier
instances. Over all instances, target allocations are hardest to achieve for the Capacity
Value rule, followed by Equal Benefits and then Load Value. Again as expected, the Lim-
ited Control and Stabilized Limited Control models are more successful at achieving the
target allocations than the Strict Control model.
Figures 20 and 21 summarize the performance of fairness measures and behavioral mod-
els for alliances comprised of three similar carriers (i.e. three carriers of the same classifica-
tion) and alliances comprised of three carriers with dissimilar network sizes (i.e. one carrier
of type C1, one carrier of type C2 or C3, and one carrier of type C4 or C5). Compar-
ing the results, we observe that relative success in achieving the target allocation does not
change significantly between the two sets of instances. This implies that varying network
size and fleet capacity of collaborating carriers does not substantially impact the relative
performance of a particular fairness measure.
Finally, Figure 22 summarizes the results for each fairness measure and model for al-
liances containing at least one freight forwarder. The performance of the Strict Control
model is markedly worse for these instances, while the Limited Control and Stabilized Lim-
ited Control models perform slightly worse for the Equal Benefits and Load Value measures,
and marginally better for the Capacity Value measure. (The improved performance for the
Capacity Value rule occurs because it is feasible to allocate no benefit to freight forwarders
under both the Limited Control model and the Stabilized Limited Control model.)





































































































(b) Equal Benefits (D2)





































































































(b) Load Value (D1)


















































































































































































































































































































Figure 21: Performance of Fairness Measures for Three Carrier Alliances Containing
























































































































































Figure 22: Performance of Fairness Measures for Three Carrier Alliances Containing
Forwarders
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better for three-carrier instances than does the Strict Control model.
4.4.3 WOW Alliance
When applied to the WOW alliance example, the equal benefits, capacity value, and load
value fairness measures perform very well under the Limited Control and Stabilized Limited
Control model. In fact, for all 30 instances generated for the four-carrier alliance, the target
allocation was exactly matched under these two behavioral models.
The performance of the fairness measures under the Strict Control model was not tested.
First, the results of the previous experiments indicate that the Limited Control and Stabi-
lized Limited Control are more appropriate models to use when adapting the mechanism.
Second, on even this scaled-down version of a real-world alliance, the Strict Control model
yields an inverse problem so large that it cannot be easily solved on a machine with 16G
of memory. (Recall that in Section 2.5.2 it was shown that the Strict Control model con-
tains approximately n times the number of constraints as the Limited Control model, where
n = |N |.)
In order to gain insight into how alliance benefit is allocated under each fairness measure,
the target allocations are summarized in Table 22. For each carrier, the target allocation
and percent of alliance benefit allocated to the carrier are shown for each fairness measure,
where “EB” denotes the Equal Benefits rule, “CV” denotes the Capacity Value rule, and
“LV” denotes the Load Value rule. Once again, the results represent the rounded average
over 30 generated instances.
As with the two and three-carrier alliances analyzed in the previous section, demand
distribution has very little impact on how alliance benefit is apportioned; carriers are allo-
cated a very similar percentage of alliance benefit under both distributions. The capacity
value and load value rules in general behave as expected, with LH commanding the largest
portion of alliance benefit due to its larger size. (As can be seen in Table 15 in Section
3.4.1, LH operates approximately 55% of all alliances legs, while JAL, SAS, and SIA each
operate approximately 15%.)
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Table 22: Target Allocations for WOW Alliance
(a) Distribution D1
Meas- JAL LH SAS SIA
ure xJAL yJAL / yN xLH yLH / yN xSAS ySAS / yN xSIA ySIA / yN
EB 325.5 25.0% 1105.6 25.0% 438.1 25.0% 481.0 25.0%
CV 227.1 12.8% 1324.4 52.0% 388.4 18.9% 410.1 16.3%
LV 230.6 13.3% 1312.9 50.6% 412.6 21.9% 394.0 14.3%
(b) Distribution D2
Meas- JAL LH SAS SIA
ure xJAL yJAL / yN xLH yLH / yN xSAS ySAS / yN xSIA ySIA / yN
EB 339.7 25.0% 1107.2 25.0% 422.6 25.0% 448.4 25.0%
CV 220.7 12.6% 1369.8 52.4% 363.2 18.8% 364.1 16.2%
LV 227.6 13.3% 1352.1 50.6% 392.5 21.9% 345.7 14.3%
4.5 Summary
It is clear from the performance of the fairness measures under each behavioral model
that the Limited Control and Stabilized Limited Control models are more successful at
ensuring a target allocation can in fact be obtained. Furthermore, they are more practical
from an implementation standpoint; because the inverse problems InvLC and InvSLC are
significantly smaller than InvStrict, they require less memory to solve.
The allocations dictated by the fairness measures change appropriately with the charac-
teristics of the carriers, indicating that choosing to allocate revenue using a measure based
on characteristics of the alliance setting is a reasonable approach. That the performance
of the measures is not significantly impacted by distribution of demand is also promising,
implying that the measures may be suitable for a wide variety of alliance circumstances.
Finally, the equal benefits, capacity value, and load value fairness measures are all easy to
compute, offering another practical advantage over the Shapley and nucleolus allocations.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This chapter summarizes the primary contributions of this thesis and describes both tech-
nical extensions and high level research questions motivated by this work.
5.1 Summary
In Chapter 2 a mechanism is proposed that manages the interactions of carriers in an alliance
such that the alliance optimal acceptance and routing of loads is attained. The mechanism
allocates alliance resources and profits through the use of capacity exchange prices; after
appropriate capacity exchange prices are determined, the allocation of revenue is achieved
without the need for a centralized manager.
Two distinct ways of modeling the perspective of an individual carrier within an alliance
are proposed: a Strict Control model requiring the oversight of a centralized authority, and
a Limited Control model that is self-managing. The ability of the mechanism to achieve
alliance optimal behavior under the different behavioral models is analyzed, leading to
several interesting practical and theoretical insights:
• Surprisingly, the Limited Control model can guarantee centralized feasibility while
the Strict Control model cannot; this is a clear practical advantage of the Limited
Control model.
• The Strict Control model always defines an allocation in the core, but many core
allocations are excluded from the feasible region of the inverse problem defined by
this model. On the other hand, the feasible region for the inverse problem defined by
the Limited Control model defines more allocations in the core, but may also include
non-core allocations. (The Stabilized Limited Control model is proposed to eliminate
from the feasible region any allocation outside the core.)
• It is shown that secondary markets will not exist when the Strict Control model is
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employed, which is a practical advantage of this model since secondary markets lead
to behavior that is detrimental to the alliance as a whole.
• Overall, the discovery that differences in modeling can significantly impact the per-
formance of the mechanism is itself a key insight.
The compatibility of carriers and the potential for alliance success is studied in Chapter
3. In addition to confirming that the management mechanism proposed in Chapter 2
performs as expected, the computational results lead to interesting insights regarding how
the characteristics of the associated demand, network, and fleet of collaborating carriers
impacts the benefit to be gained by collaborating. In addition to two and three-carrier
alliances comprised of various types of carriers, the WOW cargo alliance is also studied.
The most notable insights are as follows:
• The benefit to be gained by collaborating increases with the network and fleet size of
a partnering carrier, and fleet size is the more important factor.
• Results suggest the benefit associated with collaborating increases in an approximately
linear fashion with the number of hub-to-hub routes between hubs of partnering car-
riers.
• The ideal level of market overlap varies between 20% and 60% depending on the
characteristics of the partnering carriers.
The notion of fairness in allocation is the subject of Chapter 4, in response to observing
that more control is necessary over the allocations obtained from the mechanism proposed
in Chapter 2. Several measures of fairness are proposed, two of which (capacity value and
load value) are based on characteristics of the carriers participating in the alliance. In
addition to the appeal of allocation methods defined based on the setting in which they
are applied, the proposed measures can be efficiently computed, in contrast to traditional
allocation schemes studied in the cooperative game theory literature. A methodology for
enforcing a minimum service level for each carrier is also proposed.
Key insights from Chapter 4 include the following:
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• Computational results suggest that the Limited Control and Stabilized Limited Con-
trol model are more suitable than the Strict Control model for adapting the mecha-
nism to incorporate fairness, since these models have a much higher success rate for
achieving the desired “fair” allocation.
• Achieving a target allocation using the Strict Control model is especially difficult when
freight forwarders are involved in the alliance.
• The equal benefits and load value fairness measures have the highest success rate
among the allocations; the capacity value fairness measure is more difficult to achieve.
• The distribution of demand, network size, and fleet capacity of collaborating carriers
seem to have minimal impact on the success of a particular fairness measure.
5.2 Future Research Directions
The primary technical extension that follows naturally from this work is the incorporation
of time into the centralized model and behavioral models. The decision to represent flight
networks through geography only was made in order to simplify analysis; geography was
the primary consideration since timing of flights can be more easily adjusted than landing
rights can be acquired. The most important impact of including time in the analysis is
that frequency of flights between a particular origin and destination can be more easily and
accurately be accounted for.
A second technical extension is related to the proposed measures of fairness in Chapter
4. The performance of the measures was explored from a primarily computational perspec-
tive; interesting insights may be gained from conducting a thorough theoretical analysis of
conditions that restrict the ability of the mechanism to achieve a target allocation. For
example, a theoretical analysis of the ability of the Strict Control model to achieve a target
allocation computed according to the Equal Benefits fairness measure is conducted for a
small example in Appendix B. The conditions impacting whether a target allocation can be
achieved will likely vary for various combinations of fairness measure and behavioral model.
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Third, there are interesting extensions to explore concerning the definitions of the pro-
posed fairness rules. The proposed rule in which fairness is measured according to the value
of loads can be refined to discount loads that are not delivered when all carriers work alone.
In addition, using shadow prices for capacity should be explored as a method for defining
a measure which values both the capacity and loads associated with a carrier.
There are several interesting high-level research questions motivated by this work. First,
it is important to explore how secondary markets for capacity can best be prevented. In
Chapter 2 it is shown that the Strict Control model prevents secondary markets, but in
Chapter 4 it becomes clear that the Limited Control model (or Stabilized Limited Control
model) is a more appropriate modeling choice when fairness in allocation is considered.
While trading capacity in the secondary market may be contractually eliminated, a more
elegant approach is to identify a way that they can mathematically be prevented. Can
the Limited Control model be adapted to prevent a profitable secondary market while
maintaining the advantage of a larger feasible region for capacity exchange prices?
Second, this work explores how the characteristics of a carrier’s existing network and
fleet impact the success of an alliance. While it is important for carriers to be able to
identify existing synergies with potential partners, it is also important to understand how
a carrier can make strategic decisions to improve the benefit associated with collaborating.
For example, what steps can a small carrier take to make himself an attractive partner for a
larger carrier? Are there certain markets that the small carrier should add to his network,
or on the other hand, markets for which the carrier should discontinue service? Answering
questions such as these will not only aid carriers in making business decisions for long-term
profitability, but help alliance partners continuously evolve, ensuring sustainability of the
alliance.
A third interesting question is the following: how robust are capacity exchange prices
with respect to variability in demand? Answering this question will lend insight to how
the methodology developed in this thesis can be applied in practice. If capacity exchange
prices are shown to be robust, then a stronger argument can be made for the applicability
of this work in the real world. If, on the other hand, small changes in demand result in
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significant changes to the capacity exchange prices, then there is value in exploring whether
the methodology can be changed to make it more robust. For example, can the inverse
problem be adapted to drive the mechanism towards solutions that are more robust, similar
to how the mechanism was driven towards a particular fair allocation in Chapter 4?
Fourth, it is interesting from a theoretical perspective to question if the centralized ob-
jective of maximizing alliance revenue is the best choice. Are there other objectives that
perform better for some, or perhaps all, secondary considerations such as fairness and pre-
vention of secondary markets? While it can be argued that maximizing revenue is a primary
concern for cargo carriers, it may be the case that pursuing other objectives significantly
improves alliance performance for secondary considerations with minimal impact on alliance
revenue.
Finally, there is value in exploring if the general results or insights from this work
can be applied in other contexts. Natural candidates include collaborative ventures that
can be modeled using networks or linear programs. Because the methodology is based on
collaborative relationships in which decentralized control is desirable (i.e. alliances rather
than mergers or acquisitions), applications in which there is are barriers to total integration
are the most promising.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF APPROXIMATED NETWORKS FOR WOW
ALLIANCE





Tokyo Osaka Tokyo Osaka
Amsterdam x London x x
Bangkok x x Los Angeles x
Beijing x x Manila x
Brisbane x Mexico City x
Busan x x Milan x
Chicago x Moscow x
Dalian x x New York x
Delhi x Paris x
Denpasar x x Qingdao x x
Frankfurt x Rome x
Guam x x San Francisco x
Guangzhou x x Sao Paulo x
Hangzhou x x Seoul x x
Hanoi x x Shanghai x x
Ho Chi Minh City x Singapore x x
Hong Kong x x Sydney x
Honolulu x x Taipei x x
Jakarta x Vancouver x
Kaohsiung x Xiamen x
Kona x Xian x
Kuala Lumpur x
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Frankfurt Munich Frankfurt Munich
Abu Dhabi x Donetsk x
Abuja x Dubai x x
Accra x Dublin x
Addis Ababa x Edinburgh x
Alexandria x Ekaterinburg x
Almaty x Faro x
Amman x Florence x x
Amsterdam x x Gdansk x x
Ancona x Geneva x x
Ankara x Genoa x
Ashgabat x Gothenburg x x
Asmara x Graz x x
Athens x x Guangzhou x
Atlanta x Helsinki x x
Baku x Ho Chi Minh City x
Bangalore x Hong Kong x x
Bangkok x x Houston x
Barcelona x x Hyderabad x
Bari x Istanbul x x
Basel x x Izmir x
Beijing x x Jakarta x
Beirut x Jeddah x
Belgrade x x Johannesburg x
Bern x Kattowice x
Bilbao x Kazan x
Billund x c Khartoum x
Birmingham x x Kiev x x
Bologna x x Krakow x x
Bordeaux x Kuala Lumpur x
Boston x Kuwait x
Bratislava x Lagos x
Brussels x x Larnaca x
Bucharest x x Linz x
Budapest x x Lisbon x x
Buenos Aires x Ljubliana c c
Cairo x London x x
Calgary x Los Angeles x x
Cape Town x Lyon x x
Caracas x Madrid x x
Casablanca x Malta x
Charlotte x Manchester x x
Chennai x Manila x
Chicago x x Marseille x x
Copenhagen x x Mexico City x
Dallas/Ft. Worth x Miami x
Dammam x Milan x x
DC x x Minsk x
Delhi x x Montreal x
Denver x Moscow x x
Detroit x Mumbai x x
Dnepropetrovsk x Muscat x
Continued on next page
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Frankfurt Munich Frankfurt Munich
Nagoya x Sofia x
Naples x St Petersburg x
New York x x Stavanger x
Nice x x Stockholm x
Nizniy Novgorod x Strasbourg x
Osaka x Talinn x x
Oslo x x Tbilisi
Paris x x Teheran x x
Perm x Tel Aviv x x
Philadelphia x Timisoara x
Pisa x Tokyo x x
Port Harcourt x Toronto x x
Portland x Toulouse x
Porto x Trieste
Poznan x x Tripoli x x
Prague x x Tunis x
Riga x Turin x c
Riyadh x Ufa x
Rome x x Valencia x
Rostov x Vancouver x x
Samara x Venice x x
San Fancisco x x Verona x
Sana’a x Vienna x x
Santiago de Chile x Vilnius x x
Sao Paulo x Warsaw x x
Sarajevo x Wroclaw x x
Seoul x Yerevan x
Shanghai x x Zagreb x
Singapore x Zurich x
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Copenhagen Stockholm Copenhagen Stockholm
Aberdeen x Madrid x
Amsterdam x x Malaga x
Athens x x Manchester x x
Bangkok x Milan x x
Beijing x x Moscow x x
Bergen x x Munich x x
Berlin x x New York x x
Birmingham x Nice x x
Bologna x Nuremberg x
Bristol x Oslo x x
Brussels x x Palanga x
Budapest x Palma Mallorca x
Chicago x x Paris x x
Cologne x x Poznan x
Copenhagen x Prague x x
DC x Pristina x
Dublin x x Reykjavik x x
Dusseldorf x x Riga x
Frankfurt x x Rome x x
Gdansk x Seattle x
Geneva x x Split x
Glasgow x St. Petersburg x x
Gothenburg x x Stavanger x
Hamburg x x Stockholm x
Hanover x Stuttgart x x
Helsinki x x Tallinn x
Istanbul x Tokyo x
Kangerlussuaq x Venice x
Kristiansand x Vienna x x
London x x Warszaw x
Luxembourg x Zurich x x
Lyon x
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Table 27: Common Destinations for Pairs of Carriers in WOW Alliance
JAL, LH JAL, SIA LH, SAS LH, SIA SAS, SIA
Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam
Bangkok Bangkok Athens Athens Athens
Beijing Beijing Bangkok Bangalore Bangkok
Chicago Brisbane Beijing Bangkok Beijing
Delhi Delhi Birmingham Barcelona Copenhagen
Ho Chi Minh City Frankfurt Bologna Beijing Frankfurt
Jakarta Guangzhou Brussels Cairo Istanbul
Kuala Lumpur Hanoi Budapest Cape Town London
London Ho Chi Minh City Chicago Chennai Manchester
Los Angeles Jakarta Copenhagen Copenhagen Milan
Manila Kuala Lumpur DC Delhi Moscow
Mexico City London Dublin Dubai New York
Milan Los Angeles Gdansk Ho Chi Minh City Paris
Moscow Manila Geneva Hong Kong Rome
New York Milan Gothenburg Hyderabad Tokyo
Paris Moscow Helsinki Istanbul Zurich
Rome New York Istanbul Jakarta
San Fancisco Paris London Jeddah
Seoul Rome Lyon Johannesburg
Shanghai San Francisco Madrid Kuala Lumpur
Singapore Seoul Manchester London
Toulouse Shanghai Milan Los Angeles
Vancouver Sydney Moscow Manchester
Taipei New York Manila
Vancouver Nice Milan
JAL, SAS Oslo Moscow
Amsterdam Paris Mumbai
Bangkok Poznan Nagoya




Milan Stockholm San Francisco
Moscow Tallinn Seoul







THE STRICT CONTROL MODEL AND EQUAL BENEFITS
FAIRNESS MEASURE: A SMALL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
Consider the following simple system, System S, in which carrier A operates a leg with
origin o, destination d, and capacity k. There are two loads in the system, also with origin
o and destination d; one load is associated with carrier A and one load is associated with




Figure 23: System S
Throughout this analysis we will make use of simplified notation for ease of exposition.
The revenue associated with load (o, d, i), r(o,d,i), will be denoted as ri, size d(o,d,i) as di,
flow f (o,d,i)(o,d) as f
i





Theorem 11. Under the Strict Control model, a target allocation for System S computed
according to the Equal Benefits rule can be achieved if and only if neither of the following
mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied:
1. rB > rA, dB ≥ k, dA < k, and rA > rBk
2k−dA
2. rA ≥ rB, dA < k, dA + dB > k.
Proof. The allocations for each carrier are as follows: xA = rAfA + cfB, xB = rBfB − cf b.
The benefit for carrier B is yB = xB − v(B) = xB since carrier B does not operate any
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capacity. Under the Equal Benefits rule, yB = 12y
N = 12 [x
A + xB − v(A) − v(B)] =
1
2 [x
A + xB − v(A)]. Because there are only two carriers in this system, x = x if and
only if yB = yB, which implies xB = 12 [x
A + xB − v(A)], or xB = xA − v(A). Therefore





v(A)− rAfA + rBfB
2fB
(88)
will be referred to as the key equation.
The inverse problem constraints under the Strict Control model for System S are written
in general form below, with the primal variable corresponding to each constraint indicated



































































































Inequalities (89)-(92) correspond to carrier A; these inequalities ensure that f∗ will be
optimal for carrier A. Similarly, inequalities (93)-(96) are associated with carrier B. The
variable c represents the capacity exchange price on leg (o, d).
116








































rB − βB,B (100)
where (97) follows directly from inequalities (89) and (90), (98) follows directly from (91)
and (92), (99) follows directly from (93) and (94), and (100) follows directly from (95) and
(96).
Note that f∗i(o,d) = f
∗i
(d,o), where f
∗ is the centralized optimal solution for System S. As
a result, (97) and (99) must hold with equality when f∗A(o,d) = f
∗A
(d,o) > 0, and are inequalities
otherwise. Similarly, (98) and (100) must hold with equality when f∗B(o,d) = f
∗B
(d,o) > 0,
and are inequalities otherwise. Furthermore, in order to satisfy complementary slackness
conditions as described in Section 2.4, βi,j = 0 when f∗j < dj .
The 13 cases depicted in Figure 24 are mutually exclusive and represent all possible rela-
tionships among the problem parameters ri, di, and k for System S. Table 28 summarizes,
for each case, the values of f∗, v(A), and c in terms of the parameters ri, di, and k, where
c is computed according to the key equation (88).
For each of the 13 cases we will further simplify InvStrict for System S and find the
feasible range for c. We will then analyze if the value of c which satisfies the key equation
(88) is within this feasible range. If so, then the target allocation x can always be satisfied
for that case.
Case 1
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and (99) are
inequalities. 0 < fB < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that (98) and (100) must
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Figure 24: Case Diagram
Table 28: Case Descriptions
Case f∗i † v(A) c = v(A)−r
AfA+rBfB
2fB
1 fA = 0, fB = k < dB rAdA c = r
AdA+rBk
2k





3 fA = 0, fB = k = dB rAdA c = r
AdA+rBk
2k











2fB = dB < k






2dBfB = dB < k






2fB = dB < k
8 fA = k ≤ dA, fB = 0 rAk 0 = 0






2fB = dB ≤ k − dA





2fB = k − dA < dB




= rA = rB
k < dA + dB rBk






2fBk < dA + dB rBdA






†f i = f i(o,d) = f
i(d, o)
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hold with equality (=). Consequently, inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to rA ≤ c ≤ rB.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
AdA+rBk
2k . We will first show that
this value of c is never greater than rB:
rAdA+rBk
2k ≤ rB ⇒ rAdA ≤ rBk ⇒ rB ≥ rA(d
A
k ) which must be true since r
B > rA and
dA
k < 1.
However, c = r
AdA+rBk
2k can in fact be less than r
A; this occurs when rA > r
Bk
2k−dA . We have
therefore established that in Case 1, the target allocation for System S will be satisfied if
and only if rA ≤ rBk
2k−dA .
Case 2
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and (99) are
inequalities. 0 < fB < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that (98) and (100) must
hold with equality (=). Consequently, inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to rA ≤ c ≤ rB.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
A+rB
2 . We will first show that this
value of c is never greater than rB:
rB+rA
2 ≤ rB ⇒ rA ≤ rB, which must always be true since we are in Case 2.
Next, we show that this value of c is never less than rA:
rB+rA
2 ≥ rA ⇒ rB ≥ rA, which again must always be true since we are in Case 2.
We have established that in Case 2, there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results
in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 3
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and (99) are in-
equalities. 0 < fB < dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with equality. Consequently,
inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to rA + βA,B ≤ c ≤ rB − βB,B, which in turn reduces
to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0.
As in Case 1, the key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
AdA+rBk
2k . Again, this
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value of c is never greater than rB:
rAdA+rBk
2k ≤ rB ⇒ rAdA ≤ rBk ⇒ rB ≥ rA(d
A
k ) which must be true since r
B > rA and
dA
k < 1.
However, c = r
AdA+rBk
2k is less than r
A when rA > r
Bk
2k−dA . We have therefore established
that in Case 3, the target allocation will be satisfied for System S if and only if rA ≤ rBk
2k−dA .
Case 4
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and (99) are
inequalities. 0 < fB < dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with equality (=).
Consequently, inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to rA + βA,B ≤ c ≤ rB − βB,B, which
in turn reduces to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0.
As in Case 2, the key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
A+rB
2 . This value of
c is never greater than rB:
rB+rA
2 ≤ rB ⇒ rA ≤ rB, which must always be true since we are in Case 4.
Furthermore, this value of c is never less than rA:
rB+rA
2 ≥ rA ⇒ rB ≥ rA, which again must always be true since we are in Case 4.
We have established that in Case 4, there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results
in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 5
In System S, 0 < fA = dA implies that (97) and (99) must hold with equality (=). 0 <
fB = dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with equality (=). Consequently, InvStrict
reduces to
αA = rA − βA,A
αA = c− βA,B
αB = −βB,A = 0 (101)
αB = rB − c− βB,B
where the last equality in (102) holds because αB ≥ 0 and βB,A ≥ 0. InvStrict therefore
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further reduces to rA−βA,A +βA,B = c = rB−βB,B. Because αA ≥ 0, it must be true that
rA − βA,A ≥ 0, which implies that InvStrict ultimately reduces to 0 ≤ c ≤ rB. Note that
these bounds on c imply nothing about the relationship between rA and rB. This makes
intuitive sense because of the conditions of Case 5; because dA ≤ k−dB and dB < k, it must
be true that dA + dB < k. Therefore, in the Centralized solution for System S, both loads
are completely delivered. Because carrier A owns the capacity on leg (o, d), he can also
completely deliver his own load when working alone. Carrier A therefore earns the same
revenue from delivering loads in both the Centralized and local case. As a result, any solu-
tion in which c ≥ 0 will be feasible for the inverse problem associated with carrier A, which
is described by equations (89)-(92). On the other hand, carrier B earns no direct revenue
by working alone, and therefore any c for which carrier B’s allocation xB = rBfB(d,o)−cfB(d,o)
is non-negative will be feasible for the inverse problem associated with carrier B, described
by equations (93)-(96). It follows that any c ≤ rB is feasible for (93)-(96), and we have the
desired result that 0 ≤ c ≤ rB.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
B
2 . Since r
B > 0, it follows that
0 ≤ c ≤ rB, and there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results in an allocation
that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 6
In System S, 0 < fA = k − dB < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and
(99) must hold with equality (=). 0 < fB = dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with
equality (=). Consequently, InvStrict reduces to rA + βA,B = c = rB − βB,B, which in
turn reduces to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0.
The key equation (88) for this case is c = r
A(dA+dB−k)+rBdB
2dB
. We will first show that




⇒ rA(dA + dB − k) + rBdB ≤ 2rBdB
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⇒ rA ≤ rB( dB
dA+dB−k )
Since we are in Case 6, dA+dB−k > 0. Furthermore, dA < k implies that dA+dB−k > dB.
We conclude that rA ≤ rB( dB
da+dB−k ) must always be true since r
A < rB.




⇒ rA(dA + dB − k) + rBdB ≥ 2rAdB
⇒ rAdA − rAk + rBdB ≥ rAdB
⇒ rA(dB − dA + k) ≤ rBdB
⇒ rA ≤ rB( dB
dB−dA+k )
⇒ rA ≤ rB( dB
dB−k+k ) (because d
A < k)
⇒ rA < rB which must always be true since we are in Case 6.
We have established that in Case 6, there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results
in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 7
In System S, 0 < fA = k − dB < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that (97) and
(99) must hold with equality (=). 0 < fB = dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with
equality (=). Consequently, InvStrict reduces to rA + βA,B = c = rB − βB,B, which in
turn reduces to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
A+rB
2 . Since we are in Case 7,
rA < rB and it can easily be verified that rA < r
A+rB
2 < r
B. It follows that there always
exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target
allocation for System S.
Case 8
The key equation reduces to 0 = 0 because v(A) = rAk, fA = k, and fB = 0. The key
equation (88) is therefore satisfied by any c which is feasible for InvStrict. From Section
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2.4.2 we know that a feasible solution to InvStrict must exist, so we conclude that the
target allocation for System S can always be satisfied in this case.
Case 9
In System S, 0 < fA = dA implies that (97) and (99) must hold with equality (=). 0 <
fB = dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with equality (=). Consequently, InvStrict
reduces to
αA = rA − βA,A
αA = c− βA,B
αB = −βB,A = 0 (102)
αB = rB − c− βB,B
where the last equality in (102) holds because αB ≥ 0 and βB,A ≥ 0. InvStrict therefore
further reduces to rA − βA,A + βA,B = c = rB − βB,B. Because αA ≥ 0, it must be true
that rA − βA,A ≥ 0, which implies that InvStrict ultimately reduces to 0 ≤ c ≤ rB. The
intuitive argument made in Case 5 regarding the bounds on c applies in this case as well.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
B
2 . Since r
B > 0, it follows that
0 ≤ rB2 ≤ rB, and there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results in an allocation
that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 10
In System S, 0 < fA = dA implies that equations (97) and (99) must hold with equality.
0 < fB = k − dA < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that equations (98) and (100)
must hold with equality. Consequently, InvStrict reduces to
αA = rA − βA,A
αA = c
αB = −βB,A = 0 (103)
αB = rB − c
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where the last equality in (103) holds because αB ≥ 0 and βB,A ≥ 0. InvStrict therefore
further reduces to rB = c = rA−βA,A, and finally c = rB ≤ rA. Intuitively, it is reasonable
that c cannot be less than rB, because then it would be optimal for carrier B to deliver more
than fB of load B. (Recall that under the Strict Control model, the capacity available to
carrier B in his individual problem is k.) Likewise, if c > rB, carrier B’s optimal solution
would be fB = 0, since carrier B loses money by delivering load B.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
B
2 . Because r
B > 0, it is not pos-
sible for c = rB. We conclude that in this case there cannot exist a c feasible for InvStrict
that results in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
Case 11
For this case, instead of reducing inequalities (97)-(100) based on the characteristics of f∗,
we instead propose a solution that satisfies InvStrict. The solution c = rA = rB, αA =
αB = βB,A = βB,B = 0, βA,A = rA, βA,B = rB satisfies (97)-(100) at equality, and is
therefore feasible. As c = rA = rB is always a feasible solution for InvStrict, it follows that
in this case the target allocation can always be satisfied for System S.
Intuitively, in this case the centralized profit for System S is the same amount as the
profit carrier A can earn alone. Therefore if any capacity is used by carrier B, carrier A
must be compensated at least rA per unit of capacity used by carrier B. That is, c ≥ rA.
Since rA = rB, c ≥ rB. On the other hand, if c > rB it cannot be optimal for carrier B to
use any capacity, since he would lose money by doing so, so c ≤ rB. (Note that in this case,
multiple optimal solutions exist for the Centralized problem, so it is possible for fB > 0.)
Case 12
We first analyze five subcases for the relationship of f i and di in System S and demonstrate
for each case that the only value of c feasible for InvStrict is c = rB.
Case 12a
In System S, 0 < fA = dA implies that equations (97) and (99) must hold with equality.
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0 < fB < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that equations (98) and (100) must hold
with equality. Consequently, InvStrict reduces to
αA = rA − βA,A
αA = c
αB = −βB,A = 0 (104)
αB = rB − c
where the last equality in (104) holds because αB ≥ 0 and βB,A ≥ 0. InvStrict therefore
further reduces to rB = c = rA − βA,A, and finally c = rB ≤ rA.
Case 12b
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that equations (97) and
(99) are inequalities. 0 < fB = dB implies that equations (98) and (100) must hold with
equality. Consequently, inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to rA+βA,B ≤ c ≤ rB−βB,B,
which in turn reduces to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0. Since we are in Case 12, rA = rB and
we have that c = rB.
Case 12c
In System S, 0 < fA < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that equations (97) and (99)
must hold with equality. 0 < fB = dB implies that equations (98), and (100) must hold
with equality. Consequently, InvStrict reduces to rA + βA,B = c = rB − βB,B, which in
turn reduces to rA ≤ c ≤ rB since βi,B ≥ 0. Again, since rA = rB, c = rB.
Case 12d
In System S, fA = 0 < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that equations (97) and
(99) are inequalities. 0 < fB < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that equations (98)
and (100) must hold with equality. Consequently, inequalities (97)-(100) further reduce to
rA ≤ c ≤ rB, and it follows that c = rB since we are in Case 12.
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Case 12e
In System S, 0 < fA < dA implies that βA,A = βB,A = 0, and that equations (97) and (99)
must hold with equality. 0 < fB < dB implies that βA,B = βB,B = 0, and that equations
(98) and (100) must hold with equality. InvStrict therefore reduces to rA = c = rB.
The key equation (88) for Case 12 is c = r
B(fB−fA+dA)
2fB





⇒ rB(dA − fA) = rBfB
⇒ dA = fA + fB.
As we are in Case 12, dA < k. Therefore, dA = fA + fB implies fA + fB < k, which is a
contradiction on the optimality of fA and fB. We conclude that in this case there cannot
exist a c feasible for InvStrict that results in an allocation that exactly satisfies the target
allocation for System S.
Case 13
In System S,0 < fA = dA implies that (97) and (99) must hold with equality (=). 0 <
fB = dB implies that (98) and (100) must hold with equality (=). Consequently, InvStrict
reduces to
αA = rA − βA,A
αA = c− βA,B
αB = −βB,A = 0 (105)
αB = rB − c− βB,B
where the last equality in (105) holds because αB ≥ 0 and βB,A ≥ 0. InvStrict therefore
further reduces to rA − βA,A + βA,B = c = rB − βB,B. Because αA ≥ 0, it must be true
that rA − βA,A ≥ 0, which implies that InvStrict ultimately reduces to 0 ≤ c ≤ rB. The
intuitive argument made in Case 5 regarding the bounds on c applies in this case as well.
The key equation (88) for this case simplifies to c = r
B
2 . Since r
B > 0, it follows that
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Table 29: Case Summary
Case f∗i †
Feasible Range Conditions When
for c Key Eqn. (88) Satisfied
1 fA = 0, fB = k < dB rA ≤ c ≤ rB rA > rBk2k−da
2 fA = 0, fB = k < dB rA ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
3 fA = 0, fB = k = dB rA ≤ c ≤ rB rA > rBk2k−da
4 fA = 0, fB = k = dB rA ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
5 fA = dA ≤ k − dB, fB = dB < k 0 ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
6 fA = k − dB < dA, fB = dB < k rA ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
7 fA = k − dB < dA, fB = dB < k rA ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
8 fA = k ≤ dA, fB = 0 N/A‡ always satisfied
9 fA = dA < k, fB = dB ≤ k − dA 0 ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
10 fA = dA, fB = k − dA < dB c = rB ≤ rA never satisfied
11 fA + fB = k < dA + dB c = rA = rB always satisfied
12 fA + fB = k < dA + dB c = rB never satisfied
13 fA = dA, fB = dB 0 ≤ c ≤ rB always satisfied
†f i = f i(o,d) = f
i(d, o)
‡ A feasible range for c exists, but the specific range is irrelevant since (88) reduces to 0 = 0.
0 ≤ rB2 ≤ rB, and there always exists a c feasible for InvStrict that results in an allocation
that exactly satisfies the target allocation for System S.
The results of the thirteen cases are summarized in Table 29. As the table shows,
the conditions which prevent the Strict Control model from achieving the Equal Benefits
allocation for System S are either (1) rB < rA, dB ≥ k, dA < k, and rA > rBk
2k−dA or (2)
rA ≥ rB, dA < k, and dA + dB > k.
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